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of Messrs. Armand, Etzel and Giordani to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the six Euratom countries 
May 4th, 1957 
Your Excellency, 
In accordance with the terms of reference laid down for us by 
yourself and your colleagues, we have the honour to attach our Report 
on the amounts of nuclear energy which can be produced in the near 
future in the six Euratom countries, and the  means to  be  employed 
for this purpose. 
In order to  draw up our Report, we first of all consulted the 
government and industrial circles responsible for nuclear energy in 
our countries. We held a series of  discussions in Paris, Brussels and 
Bonn with the authorities and with leading figures from the  French, 
Italian, Belgian, Netherlands and German industries. In view of the 
shortness of the time at our disposal, the Italian representatives were 
good  enough  to  come  specially  to  Paris, and the  Netherlands rep-
resentatives  to  Brussels.  In  Brussels we had the further advantage 
of being able  to  discuss our problems with Mr. Spaak  and his col-
leagues of the  Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market 
and Euratom. 
-7-We  were  enabled in this way to  obtain a general picture of 
the  outlook with regard  to  energy  requirements  and resources,  and 
of the nuclear programmes envisaged in each of the six countries. At 
the invitation of the  American, British and Canadian Governments, 
we then visited their countries in order to  study on the spot, with the 
assistance of qualified experts, the results of their work in the nuclear 
field  and the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  it.  These  tours  were 
exceedingly valuable from the fact-finding point of view. 
In the  United States, we  were  received by President  Eisen-
hower.  We had talks with the  Secretary of State,  Mr. John  Foster 
Dulles, with the  President of the  Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. 
Lewis Strauss, and with his colleagues and assistants. We inspected 
an atomic power station now in process of completion at Shipping-
port, and also visited the  National Laboratory at Oak  Ridge, one of 
the  main  American nuclear  research  centres.  In New  York, at a 
meeting arranged by the Atomic Industrial Forum, we met the heads 
of the  principal industrial firms  working on  the  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear energy. 
In Canada, we talked with the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Mr. Howe, and with the president of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 
Mr. Bennett. We  w~re also taken on a particularly instructive tour 
of the Canadian Atomic Research Centre at Chalk River. 
In Britain, we  met  Lord Salisbury,  Lord  President of the 
Council,  Lord  Mills,  Minister  of  Power,  Sir  Edwin  Plowden, 
Chairman of the  Atomic Energy Authority, and his colleagues and 
staff,  and  Lord  Citrine,  Chairman  of  the  Central  Electricity 
Authority, and his colleagues.  We  were given valuable information 
when  we  were  shown  round  Calder  Hall.  We  also  had various 
profitable  discussions  with representatives  of the  industrial groups 
which have  been  set  up in Britain to  build atomic power stations. 
-8-We take this opportunity to thank the American, British and 
Canadian Governments  and all those  who  helped us to  derive  such 
benefit from our inquiries. 
The  American Atomic Energy Commission and the  British 
Atomic  Energy  Authority  in  addition  most  kindly  put  at  our 
disposal experts whom we were able to  consult after we  returned, in 
order  to  line  up  our  technical  information  on  the  American and 
British reactors in our Report and its annexes. 
Our  special  thanks  are  due  on  the  American side  to  Mr. 
Richard  Cook,  Deputy  General  Manager  of the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission, Mr.  Paul Fine,  Director of the  Operations  Analysis 
Division,  Mr.  Louis  Roddis,  Deputy  Director  of  the  Reactor 
Development Division, and Mr. Andrew Vander Weyden, Deputy 
Director  of the  Division  of  International  Affairs;  and  on  the 
British side  to  Dr.  Hill,  Deputy Director of Technical  Policy  at 
the Atomic Energy Authority, Dr.  Brown,  Deputy Chief Engineer 
of Civil  Reactors,  and  Mr.  Johnson,  Overseas  Manager  in  the 
Technical  Policy  Branch.  We  are  particularly grateful  to  them 
for  their  invaluable  assistance. 
We  are,  of course,  entirely  at  your  disposal  as  regards 
answering any questions you may desire to  ask us after reading the 
Report and annexes. We would conclude by thanking your Excellency 
for the honour which you and your colleagues did us in entrusting us 
with a mission which was of such vital importance for the future of 
our countries in view of their very serious energy position and the 
potentialities opened up by nuclear energy. 
We  have  the  honour  to  remaz.n,  Your  Excellency's  most 
obedient servants, 
ARMAND  ETZEL  GIORDANI 
-9-REPORT 
A  Target for Euratom PREFACE 
On November 16, 1956, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands instructed us to report 'on the amount 
of atomic energy which can be produced in the near future in the 
six countries, and the means to he employed for this purpose'. 
On March 25, 1957, the Treaty instituting the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was signed by the same 
Ministers in Rome and is now being submitted to the parliaments 
of our six countries. In the hope that this Community can begin 
to function in the very near future, we have entitled our report: 
A Target for Euratom. 
While endeavouring to define this objective, we have been 
aware of the unique chance which the advent of nuclear energy 
offers  our countries.  Only ten years  ago,  Europe seemed to be 
condemned to have  less  abundant and more  expensive  energy 
than the United States; nobody would have imagined that this 
opportunity would  emerge.  Today,  it can be  said that if our 
countries, guided and stimulated by Euratom, make the neces-
sary effort they will in future command-as the New World does 
now-abundant and  cheap  energy  supplies,  enabling  them  to 
enter boldly into the atomic era. 
-13-ESTABLISHMENT  OF  A  TARGET 
Europe's Energy Problem. 
In the 19th century coal, produced cheaply and abundant-
ly, multiplying a  hundredfold the effectiveness of human effort, 
turned Europe into the 'workshop of the world'. In the last five 
years of postwar expansion, Europe has suddenly discovered that 
this favourable  situation has  entirely changed and that a  new 
fact conditions all its prospects: the shortage of energy threatens 
to become a rna  j or brake on economic growth. This is the context 
in which the new prospects opened up by nuclear power must be 
assessed. It has become a practical possibility at a turning point 
in Europe's economic history (1). 
In 1870, total world energy production amounted to 218 
million tons of coal.  Of this, the United Kingdom and our six 
countries  together  produced  three-quarters.  The  story  of the 
industrial development of the nineteenth century is bound up in 
these figures.  Britain and the Continent not only powered their 
own  unprecedented  industrial  progress;  they  were  the  great 
exporters of energy and its products to the world. 
Unfortunately,  if Europe's  internal  resources  of energy 
were abundant by the standards of 1870, it is becoming clear that 
by the far higher ones of 1957 and still more of 1970, they are, 
and  will  be,  increasingly  inadequate.  Though  today  our  six 
(1)  Annex I gives a detailed picture of the energy problems of the six countries to-
gether and individually. 
-15-countries alone mine more coal than the world did in 1870, they 
provide only 15o/ 0  of world energy production. The rapid growth 
of their imports since the war shows that Europe's own supplies 
of all kinds of energy are falling far behind demand. 
On the eve of the second world war, our six countries' 
energy imports  were  only five  per cent of total requirements. 
During the postwar recovery they began to rise steeply. This was 
generally assumed to he temporary,  while  European coal pro-
duction got back on its feet. And, indeed, in 1950 something like 
the pre-war equilibrium seemed to he within reach. But now, after 
the growth of the last seven years, it is clear that the demand in 
industry and transport, in the home and in agriculture is rapidly 
outrunning internal supply. Europe has lost its independence in 
energy. 
The greatest possible effort to increase the output of energy 
from conventional sources must be undertaken in our six coun-
tries. But, however great this effort, it cannot keep pace with our 
needs. The conditions in which coal is mined, much less favourable 
to mechanization than in the United States, slow up the possible 
rate of growth. As more coal is sought, the veins to he exploited 
become deeper and more difficult to work, setting a  limit to the 
further expansion of output. The same applies to hydro-electric 
power, the resources of which have been already largely develop-
ed. As for oil and natural gas, the prospects in our countries are 
good, but not by any means on a scale to bridge the gap between 
needs and supplies. 
Europe's energy imports would rise to intolerable heights 
without nuclear power. Today already the six countries import 
nearly a  quarter of their energy supplies, the equivalent of 100 
million tons of coal, most of which is  oil from the Middle East. 
The Suez Crisis has shown how precarious these supplies are. 
-16-For the  future,  we  have  assumed  the  greatest  possible 
development of conventional power sources, and have based our 
estimate of energy requirements on a  moderate hut steady rate 
of economic expansion which is  considerably slower than that 
since the war. Every effort has to be made to increase domestic 
production, hut it must he realized that even on this assumption 
fuel imports into our countries would  double in ten years  and 
treble in twenty. They would reach 200 million tons (33% of total 
requirements) in 1967 and might reach 300 million tons (40%) ten 
years later. (See Fig. A p. 21.) 
These enormous figures in fact call in question the whole 
future  of Europe's  economic  growth,  and  even of its  political 
security in the world. First, they imply an annual hill for energy 
imports rising (in round figures, at constant prices) from$ 2 billion 
now to $ 4  billion by 1967 and $ 6 billion by about 1975. Even 
taking into account the part of this hill met in national currencies, 
especially through the contribution of our merchant marine, the 
need for foreign exchange would put a  most severe strain upon 
the balance of payments of our countries. The need to earn this 
additional foreign  currency would also  involve very important 
investments in export industries. And the increased pressure to 
sell on the world market would tend to push the terms of trade 
against  Europe,  a  point  of  vital  importance  to  the  world's 
greatest trading area. 
A  second, still graver threat is the evidence, provided by 
recent political events and the ensuing oil shortage, that even the 
availability of imported energy is uncertain. Oil already provides 
over a  fifth of our countries' energy supplies. It is  cheaper per 
calorie than imported coal, and it is more convenient to handle 
and use. It is  therefore likely that most of the increase in the 
demand which must be met by imports will take the form of oil. 
-17-We  cannot  expect to  obtain this  oil  from  the  Western 
Hemisphere because demand there is rising faster than production. 
The only region of the world capable of supplying these quantities 
is  the Middle East, where  a  very high proportion of world oil 
reserves is located. The oil discoveries in the Sahara are promising, 
but it can hardly he expected to provide more than a fifth of our 
energy imports by the mid-sixties. Thus without nuclear power, 
Europe's dependence on the Middle East is  hound to increase. 
The Suez Crisis has given us a warning of  what this could mean. As 
the quantity of oil imported from the Middle East increases, there 
will he  a  corresponding increase in the political temptation to 
interfere with the flow of oil from that region. A future stoppage 
could be an economic calamity for Europe. Excessive dependence 
of our highly industrialized countries on an unstable region might 
even  lead  to  serious  political trouble throughout the world. It 
is  essential that oil should be a  commodity and not a  political 
weapon. 
The  European  economy  must  he  protected  against  an 
interruption  of oil  supplies,  by  finding  alternative  sources  of 
energy to limit the further rise in oil imports. Only nuclear power, 
providing Europe with a new source of energy, can achieve this. 
Scope for Nuclear Power. 
Though it may he used to propel ships and to heat urban 
areas, the real contribution of nuclear energy in the next twenty 
years  will  be  to  produce  base-load  electricity  in  big  power 
stations (1). 
Electricity consumption is growing rapidly, doubling every 
ten or twelve years. To  cover this new demand,  the domestic 
(1)  Base-load electricity ispowerproducedround the clock, as distinctfrom'peak-
load' power produced for only a few hours each day. 
-18-sources of energy specially adapted for power production (water, 
lignite, low-grade coal and natural gas) must he developed to the 
utmost. Even so, they cannot together meet more than one-third 
of the increase of electricity needs in the next twenty years. Two-
thirds of  the additional output must come from power stations fired 
with imported oil or coal, unless nuclear stations are built in their 
stead. The increase in production of saleable coal will be absorbed 
by other uses,  especially for  coke-ovens.  The capacity of such 
power stations is estimated to rise by 22.5  million kW, from 38 
million kW at the end of 1960 to 60.5 million kW by the end of 
1967, apart from replacements amounting to more than 5 million 
kW in this period (see Fig. E  Annex III p. 83). This is the field 
into which nuclear power can he fitted. 
Every  year  that  is  lost  in  constructing  nuclear  power 
stations means that conventional stations, requiring increased oil 
or  coal  imports-and which  continue  to  consume  oil  or  coal 
throughout their lifetime of twenty or thirty years-will he built 
instead. In view of this situation, Europe must within the limits 
set by the pattern of electricity production,  construct nuclear 
stations as rapidly as possible. 
Nuclear plants take up to four years to build. Although 
some already under construction (such as the French power plant, 
E.D.F. 1), or shortly to he ordered, should come into operation in 
1961 and 1962, nuclear power cannot he expected to provide a 
big contribution before 1963, since orders cannot he placed for 
substantial construction ofplan.ts before the end of 1958. Further, 
industry will need time to build up capacity before it can provide 
all the nuclear plant that could he used. Industrial firms will have 
to  adapt their  staffs  and  their  production facilities  to  a  new 
technology on a  big scale.  This  means that we must expect a 
progressive build up in the rate of construction of nuclear power 
-19-stations. This delay will enable us to reach decisions on the basis 
of two  or  more  years  experience  from  the  big  nuclear  power 
stations now under construction in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 
In view of these considerations, we estimate at some 15 
million k W the nuclear power capacity that can be accommodated 
in the electricity system of the six countries during the next ten 
years. If  this can he done, it will stabilize imports at the level they 
would otherwise reach in 1963 of around 165 million tons of coal 
equivalent a year (1). 
This is  an ambitious target. It will call for a  great, con-
tinuous  effort,  since  our industries,  with the  exception of the 
French, have had practically no experience in the nuclear field. 
Moreover, far from conflicting with an all-out effort to increase 
the output of conventional forms  of energy, it is  only by close 
collaboration between all methods of producing electricity that 
this target can be attained and the level of imports stabilized. 
Great Britain has already faced  a  similar issue, and has 
come to a similar conclusion. She has in fact reacted very quickly 
to  an  energy  problem that is  less  threatening than  our  own. 
Britain to-day imports only 12% of  her total energy requirements, 
while we  import 23o/ 0 ;  in ten years' time these imports, if not 
checked by nuclear power, would rise to 22% in Great Britain, 
against 33 o/ 0  in our countries. Her programme of 6 million kilo-
watts by 1965  is  expected to stabilize fuel  imports from  1960 
onward.  The  15  million kilowatts  which we  are taking as  our 
1967 target can achieve the same result for us in 1963. 
(1)  Since oil has a higher calorific value than coal, it is necessary to convert oil 
tonnages into their 'coal equivalent' to obtain comparable or total figures for energy im-
ports. 
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FIGURE  A 
Energy imports of six countries 
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nuclear  power 
1975 This target is two and a half times the British programme, 
which seems reasonable when we consider that the ratio of popu-
lation is 3 to 1, and that of electricity output 2.8 to 1, and that, 
as mentioned above, the six countries are starting out from a far 
less  favourable  position  than  Great  Britain  in  the  matter  of 
energy imports. 
It is not for us to translate this target into a programme. 
Without  doubt  our  target  is  far  larger  than  the  sum  of the 
existing plans  prepared separately by our six  countries,  plans 
which would involve the installation of about 6 million kilowatts 
capacity between now and 1967. Incidentally, it has been possible 
to  see  since  our  investigations  began-perhaps  it  should  he 
regarded as one of their first results-a very marked tendency 
for each country to expand its programme. 
We also had to compare our target and the programme it 
entails with the industrial resources available in our six countries 
for the building of  reactors. The British experience is the only one 
to which one may refer in order to have an idea of how industry 
can he adapted to an important atomic programme. In Great 
Britain,  it  is  considered  that,  by  1965  (the  execution  of the 
British programme was  started in 1955), industry will he in a 
position to install 5 to 6 m. kW of nuclear energy and, moreover, 
he able to export the same amount (1), totalling 10 to 12 m. kW 
of nuclear power capacity. The engineering industries of the six 
Euratom countries have an overall capacity which is  approxi-
mately 1.6 times that of the same industries in Great Britain (2). 
On this basis,  one can therefore consider that-given an effort 
comparable to that undertaken by Great Britain-our countries 
(1)  This export capacity is of course dependent on timely arrangements to enable 
British industry to supply difficult items such as  graphite and steel plate for pressure 
vessels. 
(2)  See  O.E.E.C.  report 'Les industries mecaniques et electriques en  Europe~ 
(1956). 
-22-should be able to build over 15 m. k W  of nuclear energy in the 
course of ten years. 
This is, of course, an appreciation of our nuclear possibili-
ties. As in any big industrial development, bottlenecks are bound 
to appear. The part which the United States, Great Britain and 
Canada play in the way of cooperation with regard to processing, 
fuel, reactor components etc., will therefore consist not only of 
facilitating our effort from a  general point of view, hut also of 
helping us to overcome the temporary difficulties which may arise 
at the start in various fields. Although our 15 m. target is ambi-
tious, it  is compatible with the industrial potential of  our countries, 
taking into account the help we can expect from Great Britain 
and the United States. 
Euratom will  create new opportunities. It will pool the 
scientific as well as the industrial resources of our six countries 
and their varied skills. A common market for nuclear equipment 
to be set up within a year will promote industrial specialization. 
Further,  Euratom  will  represent  our  nations  as  a  single  unit 
vis-a-vis other states, and will he far better placed to obtain full 
cooperation from then than our countries separately. 
Our  enquiry  abroad  has  already  shown  the  expanded 
opportunities  for  outside  help  opened  up  by  Euratom.  The 
contribution in nuclear fuels, reactor technology and components 
can make the difference between a  rapid and a  slow European 
departure  in  nuclear  power  production.  To  take  one  concrete 
example :  the  scarcity  of  trained  technicians  could  seriously 
hamper the rapid execution of a big programme. During our visit 
to America, Britain and Canada, training facilities were offered to 
Euratom on a scale never contemplated for our individual nations. 
A  critical  moment  has  been  reached:  atomic  power  is 
coming of age. Nuclear power has moved out of the scientist's 
-23-laboratory onto the engineer's drawing hoard; it will now come 
quickly into commercial phase. This provides a great opportunity 
for our countries if we seize it and a  grave danger if we do not. 
Scientific and technical knowledge can he borrowed; hut industrial 
capacity  one  must  create  oneself.  If our industries  do not  go 
ahead on a big scale now, at a time when others are poised to do 
so, they will soon he unable to face  competition from the full-
grown  industries  which have seen and seized their chances  in 
time. Later development would only he possible behind protective 
walls with all the drawbacks they involve. In view of the growing 
importance  of atomic techniques  for industry,  Europe,  as  the 
world's greatest exporter of engineering goods, cannot afford to 
miss the chance to move off to a rapid start. 
So long as we act with drive and determination, the possi-
bilities created by Euratom give us every hope of meeting the 
challenge of the atomic era,  and, in so  doing,  of resolving our 
energy problem. 
-24-CONDITIONS  OF ACHffiVEMENT 
The scientists of our countries made fundamental contri-
butions to the discoveries on which nuclear power prospects are 
based. But, as a result of the war and their divisions, they have 
taken little part during the last fifteen years in the massive and 
costly build-up of the foundations  of nuclear industry.  France 
has already begun to apply nuclear power on an industrial scale, 
and Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands are actively 
engaged in power projects and reactor development. But these 
efforts fall far short of what Britain, not to speak of the United 
States, has done to lay the basis for the commercial application 
of nuclear power. If our industries had, today, to start entirely on 
their own, an unduly slow and costly growth would be unavoid-
able. The American interest in the world-wide extension of  atomic 
energy  for  peaceful  purposes  to  which President Eisenhower's 
'atoms for peace' programme testifies, has relieved our countries 
of some of the penalties of their handicap. 
Cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
The United States government showed a  keen interest in 
the prospects of a big Euratom programme for the production of 
nuclear energy. Their well-known support for European unity and 
their interest in Europe's economic strength and stability explain 
this welcoming attitude. Europe can help America in the future 
as  America  is  prepared  to  help  us  now.  The  average  cost  of 
electricity in America is about two-thirds of what it is in Europe, 
so atomic power will compete in Europe long before it can do so 
in  the  United  States.  An  impressive  amount  of research  and 
-25-development done both through the Atomic Energy Commission 
and by private industry have provided America with the most 
complete nuclear foundation in the world.  But the large-scale 
application of this immense potential appears to be .at least five 
to ten years off.  Europe, on the contrary, needs atomic energy 
right now.  No amount of research can be  a  substitute for the 
practical knowledge to be gained by the large-scale  industrial 
application of atomic power. Europe could make this experience 
available to the United States. Our talks in Washington convinced 
us that, on the healthy basis of a two-way traffic, a close partner-
ship as equals can be built up between the United States and 
Euratom and their respective industries. 
For peaceful purposes,  our visit provided indications of 
how the partnership would work. The United States would make 
available the necessary fissile materials and the technical knowl-
edge  to set our industries going. Once Euratom is established, a 
task force composed of some of America's most able men would 
be at out disposal to continue studying with European experts 
the many technical problems posed by our programme. America 
would provide training facilities for our scientists and technicians. 
Joint projects, for instance to improve and adapt reactors, can 
be envisaged between American and European industries, as well 
as  between the American and European Atomic Energy Com-
miSSions. 
Britain has concentrated on a  reactor type which is now 
fully  in  the  commercial  phase.  The  British  authorities  have 
declared  their  readiness  to  facilitate  contacts  between  British 
firms  and those  in Europe interested in building this  type of 
reactor.  They  are  also  willing  to  assist  Euratom in the vital 
matter of training scientists and engineers, and in putting their 
experts  at our  disposal  to  study the  technical  aspects  of our 
programme. 
-26-Canada is equally prepared to cooperate. It can do so in 
two important ways. To begin with, it is one of the world's major 
sources of natural uranium. It would be ready to provide natural 
uranium to supplement European resources, provided it receives 
notices several years in advance, and that any agreement with 
Euratom  guarantees  the  use  of the  uranium  exclusively  for 
peaceful purposes. 
Further, Canada has done important original work on a 
type of reactor which promises to be particularly well adapted to 
European  requirements,  combining  as  it  does  many  of  the 
advantages  of the  natural  and  slightly  enriched  uranium  ap-
proaches  followed  so  far  by  Britain  and  the  United  States 
respectively. This reactor is w·ell into the development stage. We 
have  every  reason  to  believe  that  Euratom  would  find  the 
Canadian authorities willing to cooperate on the construction of 
prototypes. 
In consequence of the far-sigh  ted view the United States, 
Britain and Canada have taken of their interests in cooperating 
with our nations in nuclear development, we have the assurance 
that a large nuclear programme would obtain not only the benefit 
of years of development in these countries, but also the material 
supplies and technical assistance indispensable to a  quick start. 
This broad cooperation is  being offered because Euratom gives 
prospects  of joint action  on  a  scale  our countries individually 
cannot  propose  and  has  been  made  possible  by the  Euratom 
provisions for an effective system of control of fissile  materials. 
Agreements of association should therefore be concluded 
between  these  countries  and  Euratom  immediately  after  its 
establishment. At the same  time,  close  cooperation  should he 
developed with neighbouring countries, particularly Switzerland, 
Austria  and the  Scandinavian  States,  through  O.E.E.C.  or in 
other ways. 
-27,-Strong cooperative ties with other countries-by which we 
obtain,  now  and  later,  the  help  of those  who  have  explored 
nuclear possibilities more fully than we have, and in return offer 
our help in future to them and to other interested nations-must 
be the foundation of Europe's atomic progress. Far from under-
mining our independence, it is the only way we can gain our place 
as  equals  in the field.  The  road  to dependence would be the 
opposite one, to confirm our backwardness by resorting to the 
illusion of self-sufficiency. Cooperation with others will not limit 
our opportunities, but create  new  ones,  so  that our industries 
can eventually acquire their  own,  distinct nuclear personality. 
Reactor Construction. 
Our inquiry has convinced us that, though there are at 
least a  dozen prototype reactors in an advanced stage of design 
or under construction, only two types are ready for commercial 
use. One has been developed in the United States and the other 
in Britain and France (  1). 
The first  is fueled with slightly enriched uranium (2), and 
Is  cooled  by  water under  pressure,  or by boiling water.  This 
system was originally developed for submarines, and one unit has 
been functioning without interruption in the Nautilus for nearly 
two  years.  The  experience  gained  on  this  project  gives  great 
confidence  in the reliability of this  type of reactor.  Full scale 
commercial  prototypes  of both  versions  of these  reactors  are 
under construction, in several cases entirely by private firms. 
The second type, developed furthest in Britain, is the gas-
cooled  reactor  fueled  with natural uranium.  Its  prototype at 
Calder Hall has been working successfully for the last six months. 
(1)  Annex II describes reactors in greater detail. 
(2)  Uranium in which the content of the fissile isotope U -235 has been increased 
above the level of 0. 71% found in nature. 
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.. Confidence  in  the  performance  of this  reactor  enabled  Great 
Britain first to set up a  nuclear programme in the beginning of 
1955, and then, at the beginning of this year, to treble it. Several 
large stations are now under construction for the British electrici-
ty  authorities.  The  first  French  reactors  now  functioning  or 
being built are of the same type. 
Attention should he given by European firms interested in 
building power reactors and by Euratom itself to the development 
of two other types, not yet in the commercial phase, but which 
appear specially appropriate for Europe: a version of the British 
gas-cooled reactor, operating on slightly enriched uranium, and 
the  heavy-water  reactor  developed  mostly  in  Canada.  Joint 
projects might he launched by industry or Euratom to solve the 
design and development problems to be overcome before these 
reactors can become commercial. 
To begin quickly we must either buy some reactors from 
the United States and the United Kingdom or build them under 
license.  This  will  not  involve  accepting  permanent  industrial 
dependence.  On the  contrary, it will  speed up  our industries' 
nuclear education, and provide a basis of well tested experience 
to root and nourish their own original contribution. Even if the 
reactor itself has to he imported, a large proportion of each of the 
first nuclear power plants will be built by our own engineering 
industries,  and  the  proportion  of  components  that  must  be 
imported will quickly fall. 
The  industrial  re-orientation  required  will  undoubtedly 
raise difficult problems, hut they may prove less intractable than 
is often thought. Intensive re-training of engineers and scientists 
will be needed, but both the United States and the United King-
dom are ready to help.  Euratom must carry out training pro-
grammes  wit~ the facilities  they offer,  on top of those already 
existing in Europe, and those that it will itself create. Further, 
-29-the number of trained men required to design and build proven 
reactors is smaller that that needed to develop entirely new ones. 
A high proportion of  the construction work in nuclear power plant 
differs little from the tasks which engineering firms are perform-
ing today. The industrial groups which have  designed and are 
now constructing power reactors in the United Kingdom started 
with limited nuclear experience 18 months before their tenders 
were submitted to the U.K. Electricity Authorities. 
Euratom and its objectives will he the stimulus, guiding 
and  enabling  better  use  to  be  made  of our  industries.  The 
standardization of  reactor components and procurement contracts 
should be encouraged. Also, a  certain amount of general coordi-
nation will be essential because a  progra;mme involving millions 
of kilowatts under construction at any one time, and requiring a 
wide  range of new materials  and components, might easily be 
thrown  out  of  gear  by  serious  shortages  and  costly  delays. 
Industry, for example, should he informed of the need for big 
high-pressure  shells  for  reactors  at  least  four  years  ahead  of 
delivery  in  view  of the  likelihood  that its  capacity  for  their 
manufacture would have to be expanded. 
Fuel Requirements. 
Fuel requirements will depend very much on the types of 
reactor chosen by the electricity suppliers.  However, it is  now 
already clear that the fuel required to reach the target envisaged 
for Euratom will be obtained without difficulty, since its require-
ments  are  a  small  part  of world  production  of nuclear  fuels 
during the period under review {1).  The uranium production in 
our countries, although small at present, is  expected to rise as 
prospecting extends the field of known reserves. Further we have 
(l) Fuel needs are estimated in Annex III. 
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considerably if the demand is firm. 
We  also  attach particular importance  to  the  statement 
made by the  U.S.  authorities that they do  not  consider that 
nuclear  fuels  will  he  a  limiting  factor.  This  opinion has  been 
inserted in the Communique (1) which the Secretary of State and 
the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission issued jointly 
with us at the end of our discussions  in Washington.  As  this 
statement comes from the country which is  the world's biggest 
producer of enriched uranium, and one of the biggest of natural 
uranium, we can be sure that the availability of nuclear fuel will 
not limit the realization of our target. 
Euratom's  action  on  fuel  supplies  could  be  of decisive 
importance for our industries. The total expenditure on nuclear 
fuels  in the ten-year period  required to reach the target of 15 
million kW would amount to about$ 2000 million (2). According 
to the Euratom Treaty, special fissile materials will be owned by 
the  Community.  Therefore  Euratom  will  retain  title  of  the 
enriched uranium it will put at the disposal of the users and may 
well finance both enriched and natural uranium centrally as is 
done domestically in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Fuel  problems  do  not  end  with  the  supply  of fissile 
material. Both natural and enriched uranium have to be fabri-
cated into fuel elements (3)  before use. And after use they must 
generally he processed in chemical plants to recover the valuable 
fissile products still left in the spent fuel. 
(1)  See Annex V. 
{2)  See Annex III, para. 8. 
(3)  For the present types of  reactor, the nuclear fuel must be formed into cylindri-
cal or plate-type elements enclosed in suitable materials (magnesium, zirconium, stainless 
steel, beryllium, etc.). 
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plants, fuel elements can be imported from abroad, and the spent 
fuel  returned  to  he  processed.  Both America  and  Britain  are 
willing to do this, and have indicated the prices they will charge. 
But it would he inconsistent with our need to reduce our de-
pendence on costly energy imports to continue to rely on other 
countries  for  these  services.  Both  operations  require  plants 
serving many reactors to be economic. If each of our countries 
were to act as separate unit, it would take many years before it 
would be possible to build these plants on an economic basis. The 
establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community will 
allow us to build both fuel fabrication and chemical processing 
plants as soon as a  large number of reactors are being built. 
Euratom  could  also  construct  a  plant  to  produce  the 
enriched uranium needed (1). Till recently, this seemed the only 
way to obtain it. But there is now no doubt that our countries 
can  obtain  enriched  uranium  from  the  United  States  in  the 
necessary quantities, and at the low published prices. These low 
prices are a consequence of the vast size of American plants, the 
extremely low power costs in the areas where they are located, 
low  finance  costs,  and  a  very  highly  developed  design  and 
technology. Enriched uranium produced in Europe would, there-
fore, probably cost two to three times as much. 
The  building  of  a  Euratom  diffusion  plant  has  been 
advocated to avoid basing nuclear energy production on a material 
that  must  otherwise  be  obtained  from  another  country.  If 
important quantities of enriched uranium had to he permanently 
imported, this argument would carry weight. But several years 
would elapse before Euratom's diffusion plant could operate. And 
the future of enriched uranium requirements is very uncertain. 
(l) Known as 'gaseous diffusion' or 'isotope separation' plants. 
-32-Even apart from the prospect of breeder reactors (1), plutonium 
will he produced in the fuel of Europe's first reactors. It is very 
probable that we will find an economic way to use this plutonium, 
and so  reduce our needs  of enriched uranium.  Other improve-
ments in reactors may have the same effect. In the end, these 
developments might even enable power reactors of all types to 
he based exclusively on natural uranium with fuel recycling. 
Therefore, while it is essential for our countries to study 
with the  greatest  care  the  economic  and  technical  aspects  of 
uranium enrichment, it should he noted that the  decision  to 
build a  diffusion plant on a  commercial scale,  which means  a 
heavy investment of capital and would consume large quantities 
of energy, does not have to he taken before a programme for the 
production of nuclear electricity is launched. 
Costs of Nuclear Electricity. 
At what cost will electricity he produced by the nuclear 
reactors commissioned before the end of 1967? And how will this 
cost  compare with the  cost  of energy  obtained from  the new 
coal- and  oil-fired  stations  which  would  have  to  he  built  if 
nuclear plants  are not erected instead?  Certain general points 
must he mentioned. 
In the first place : only very limited experience is available 
in regard to full-scale power reactors; nuclear electricity costs are 
therefore always estimates, never proven facts.  After extensive 
checking and discussion, inter alia, with the experts whom the 
American  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  U.K.  Atomic 
Energy Authority so kindly put at our disposal, we \consider those 
which follow to he reliable. 
In the second place : the cost of electricity produced by a 
given reactor will not remain continuously on one level, hut will 
(1)  Reactors producing more fissile material than they consume. 
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the course, of time. Cost estimates must, therefore, he based on 
the  average  estimated  cost  of the  electricity  produced  by  a 
nuclear reactor in the course of its life.  Operating costs will he 
high at the outset of  the operation, hut will decline in the following 
years-to a lower level as operating conditions are stabilized. Even 
in the case of the first reactors, power costs will continue to fall 
gradually as the techniques of using fuel improve. Nuclear fuel 
costs  are  low-less  than  half the  fuel  costs  in  conventional 
plants-and the saving will apply only to about one quarter of 
total  nuclear  costs,  though  they  could  he  significant.  Unlike 
nuclear stations, the fuel  costs of conventional plants must be 
expected to rise slowly hut steadily, relative to the general level 
of prices. 
In the third place : comparison with the electricity costs of 
conventional  plant must  be  based  on  new  conventional  plant 
burning imported fuel, because we have seen that nuclear power 
plants  will  only  replace  those  which  would  have  to  consume 
imported fuel. It is impossible to evaluate in terms of costs the 
increasing risk of a  stoppage in the flow of oil from the Middle 
East. But electricity producers would he ill-advised not to take 
this risk into account. 
In the fourth place: as it is unlikely that advanced reactors 
promising far lower power costs, will come into commercial use 
before the end ofour ten-year period, we do not propose to discuss 
them. But all the best authorities (1) agree that the cost of  nuclear 
energy, even for current reactor types, will decline in the next ten 
to fifteen years. 
(1)  Cf.  two of the most important recent studies- lecture on 'The Future for 
Nuclear Power', ,delivered by Sir Christopher Hinton, member of the United Kingdom 
Atomic  Energy Authority (March 15,  1957);  and 'The Latest Prospects  f~r Economic 
Nuclear Power\ prepared by W. Kenneth Davis, Director, and Louis H. Roddis, Deputy 
Director, Division of Reactor Development, of  the United States Atomic Energy Commission 
(March 14, 1957). 
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conclusion is  that the range of costs of electricity produced by 
nuclear reactors of both the American and the British type, may 
he estimated at 11 to 14 mills per kWh, while the cost of  electricity 
from new conventional stations, which must use imported fuel, 
will he 11 to 12 mills per kWh (see Fig. B) (1). Further, while the 
cost range of conventional stations is  moving slowly upwards, 
that of nuclear power is moving down. These figures do not apply 
to the few large reactors which will he brought into service before 
1962, and which are more prototype than commercial in character. 
In view of  this cost comparison, it is clear that the time has 
come  when nuclear power can provide an economic  means to 
stabilize our energy imports. The long-term prospects of reducing 
production cost are not an argument for delay; on the contrary, 
a big commercial programme now is the best way to secure a solid 
basis for massive expansion later. 
We must finally point out that the first orders should he 
placed by the end of 1958, when results of experience will he 
available, not only from Calder Hall, hut also from Shippingport, 
which will  influence  the  decisions  for  subsequent  steps  of the 
programme. 
At this stage, it is necessary to start with big plants; hut 
this  does  not imply that the six countries  are in a  position to 
commit themselves now on the plants to he constructed during 
the ten-year period. 
Investments. 
Fuel costs loom large in the cost of conventional power and 
play only a minor role in nuclear power. In the case of  investment 
costs the opposite is true. The investment costs for nuclear plants, 
(1)  See Annex II for detailed analysis. (One mill is a thousandth of  a U.S. dollar.) 
-36-including fuel  inventory, must he  estimated for stations to he 
brought into service in the next ten years to average somewhat 
more than two and a  half times the cost of conventional steam 
stations, with a  gradual decline towards the end of the period. 
For 15 million k W the difference would approach $ 4,000 million 
(1),  or between 1  and 2  per cent of the estimated total gross 
investments of our six countries together in the next ten years. 
This additional investment burden creates some difficult problems 
for our national economies. 
To  a  certain extent,  this  implies  a  changed pattern of 
investment rather than a truly increased burden. The greater fuel 
hill for coal and oil in the absence of nuclear plants would have to 
he  paid for  by increased  exports  which,  in  their turn,  would 
require bigger investments in our export industries. Greater coal 
and oil imports for conventional stations would also require new 
investments, notably in ships and ports for their transport. 
At first,  the expenditure on nuclear power stations will 
also pose balance of  payments problems, because as much as 50% 
of their cost may have to he paid in foreign exchange. But over 
the  whole  of the  ten-year period  the total import  content of 
expenditure on nuclear plant is unlikely to exceed$ 1,100 million. 
Further if  all the fuel for 15 million k W of nuclear plant had to he 
imported-a pessimistic assumption in view of the uranium pro-
duction available within our countries-its cost would he about 
$ 2,000  million for  inventory and make-up (2)  in the first  ten 
years; and only about $ 200 million per year thereafter (ignoring 
plutonium credits), compared with an oil and coal hill to import 
fuel for the same plant capacity of about $ 800 million a year at 
present prices. 
(1)  of  which about $1,100 would be nuclear fuelinventory (see Ann. III, para. 10). 
(2)  Make-up is the amount of fresh fuel which must be put  in the reactor periodic-
ally as spent fuel is withdrawn. 
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countries would not benefit immediately by the rapid introduction 
of nuclear power, the moderate increase in imports during the 
first years will he rapidly offset by big foreign currency savings 
subsequently. For these reasons, the expenditure of larger sums 
on building nuclear rather than conventional power stations is in 
the public interest. 
However,  this  does  not help  our electricity suppliers to 
solve their investment problem; even now the rapid growth of 
electricity demand is putting a  severe strain on the investment 
resources of our electricity industries. There is a gap between the 
public interest-which calls for the achievement of our target-
and that of the individual electricity supplier, who faces commer-
cial risks by investing heavily in nuclear rather than conventional 
stations. Yet a prompt commitment on the first plants is essential, 
both in order to get a  quick start and to obtain the greatest 
experience of reactor construction in the shortest time. 
As conditions differ widely in each of our countries, we are 
not in a  position to suggest  solutions.  However, the Euratom 
Commission, jointly with the  governments  and industries  con-
cerned, should make a thorough study of this problem, for if it is 
not solved, it will make our target and the consequent stabiliza-
tion of energy imports totally illusory. They should also consider 
incentives, such as increased depreciation allowances for nuclear 
stations, operative in the first and most difficult years, and other 
financial measures. 
We  also  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  a  common 
legislative approach on insurance for nuclear plant, covering the 
third-party liability of companies  engaged in constructing and 
operating  re~ctors, as well as the liability of  manufacturers outside 
our countri~s with respect to the performance of their products. 
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I In the United States, the absence of adequate Federal legislation 
may  have  seriously  retarded  the  construction  of reactors  by 
private industry. Legislation to cover this gap is now being dis-
cussed by the U.S. Congress. All experts, both in the U.S. and the 
U.K.,  agree that the chance  of accidents  is  exceedingly small. 
Nevertheless, additional protection against liability in excess of 
the  available  insurance  coverage  is  necessary.  If an  accident 
should happen on the border of one of our countries, the damage 
might extend across frontiers. Big nuclear power stations might 
be  ordered  jointly by electricity  companies  in  several  of our 
countries. The common market for nuclear products, to be set up 
within a year of the establishment of Euratom, will also facilitate 
the placing of orders across national borders. For all these reasons, 
a common legislative approach to these problems is necessary. 
* 
*  * 
Europe's economic growth is in danger of being seriously 
hampered by the lack of energy to nourish it.  Being short of 
domestic energy supplies, our countries must turn increasingly to 
imports to meet their needs. But imports are costly; and in their 
most important  form  of Middle  East  oil,  the  supply  itself is 
uncertain.  To  rely  unduly  upon  them  would  be  increasingly 
burdensome and hazardous.  The advent of nuclear power now 
gives  us a  chance to stem their rising tide by building nuclear 
instead of new conventional power stations using imported oil or 
coal. 
Comparison between the price of nuclear and conventional 
energy has lead us to conclude that a  big effort now would be 
justified. Industrially, we believe this would be feasible, if our six 
countries act together,  with the help  of America,  Britain and 
Canada, who are ahead of us in the application of nuclear tech-
niques, and ready to cooperate fully with us. 
-39-The pooling of our financial resources, industrial capacities 
and varied skills through Euratom will enable our countries to 
muster the great effort required. Euratom will he able to guide an.d 
stimulate action, in particular by providing means to bridge the 
gap in the initial period between the commercial risk, which firms 
face in building nuclear plants, and the public need for the most 
rapid progress. 
The establishment of  the European Atomic Energy Author-
ity, on which our nations are called to decide, offers the means to 
achieve the target we envisage : the construction of 15 million k W 
of nuclear plant by the end of 1967, in order to stabilize our int-
ports early in the 1960's. 
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THE ENERGY  ECONOMY  OF  THE EURATOM  COUNTRIES 
Historical Survey of the World Output of Energy. 
1.  Up to the beginning of the first  world war the world's economic 
development was based on coal. After the turn of the century~ first in the 
U.S.A.-and much later in Europe-oil began to acquire growing import-
ance as a  source of energy. Between the two world wars natural gas and 
hydro-electric power have been developed as secondary sources of energy. 
World Production of Commercial Energy (l) 
Hard coal  Brown coal  Oil  Natural gas  Hydro-power  Total 
Million metric tons hard coal equivalent ( = Mt HCE) (2) 
1870  203  4  11  218 
1900  701  22  29  9  16  777 
1913  1216  39  77  22  45  1399 
1955  1604  152  1086  360  190  3392 
Percentage of World Production 
1870  93  2  5  100 
1900  90  3  4  1  2  100 
1913  87  3  5  2  3  100 
1955  47  4  32  11  6  100 
(1)  Primary energy in so far as it is  commercially used, wood and waste fuels 
excluded. 
(2)  Conversion factors: 
Hard coal:  7000 Kcal/kg 
Brown coal:  2100 Kcal/kg 
Oil:  10000 Kcal/kg 
Natural gas:  9000 Kcal/m3 
Hydro-power: 1870-1913:  7000  Kcal/kWh 
1955:  2800 Kcal/kWh 
Between 1870 and 1955 world production of commercial energy in-
creased at an annual rate of about 4%. At the same time the output of oil, 
-43-natural gas, and to a lesser degree also hydro-power, rose at a considerably 
faster rate than the extraction of hard coal.  Nowadays the relative im· 
portance of hard coal in the world's energy economy is only half as great 
as it was in the closing decades of the last century. 
The reasons for the slower progress of coal extraction since the be-
ginning of the first world war lies partly in the technical changes that have 
occurred in the demand for  energy, e.g.  the emergence  of the internal 
combustion engine and the diesel motor, and partly in the increasingly 
unfavourable natural conditions attaching to coal extraction. In Europe 
the exhaustion of deposits, the greater depths to which mine shafts must 
be driven, and the unfavourable conditions for the mechanization of coal 
mining play a particularly important role. They largely explain the rise in 
the real production costs  of coal,  its extremely limited adaptability to 
fluctuations in demand, and the fact that, for 30 to 40 years past, there has 
not been enough capital available for opening up deposits. The most con-
vincing evidence of all these happenings is to be found in the British coal 
mining industry. In 1870  the United Kingdom produced 54%  of all the 
world's coal, in 1913  it still  produced 25%  and in 1955  only 13%.  On 
account of the territorial changes that have taken place it is not feasible 
to make a  comparison of coal production in the ECSC countries for the 
same  period,  but there is evidence to show that the share of the ECSC 
countries in world coal production fell from about 21% in 1938 to 16% in 
1955. Even the United States of America with rich coal deposits which can 
be worked cheaply, has seen its share in world coal production fall from 
41% in 1913 to 28% in 1955. The United States' share of the world pro· 
duction of total energy is as high as it was at the beginning of the first 
world war. 
2.  A second factor which has made a significant change in the situation 
as regards output of primary energy is the rapid expansion of oil production 
in the Middle East, particularly since the end of the second world war. As 
the Middle East countries alone, on the basis of 1955  estimates, possess 
66% of proved world reserves of oil, and in addition produce it considerably 
more cheaply than other countries, this trend will continue. It  is anticipated 
that by 1975  the Middle East will be producing about 50% of world oil 
output.  During the next decades,  the oil  consumption of the Western 
Hemisphere will grow more rapidly than their production with the result 
that they will become net importers. 
-44-I.  Actual 
1938 
1955 
II. Potential (3) 
1965 
1975 
I. Actual 
1938 
1955 
II.  Potential (3) 
1965 
1975 
Actual and Potential World Oil Production (Major Areas) 
(Mt HCE and as % of World  Production) 
World  U.S.A.  Rest of  Middle  S.E.Asia  Europe  U.S.S.R. 
385 
1091 
1740 
2600 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
America  East  (1) 
Mt HCE(2) 
235  63  23 
477  230  230 
635  420  575 
635  520  1290 
as % of World  Production 
61.0 
43.7 
36.4 
24.3 
16.5 
21.0 
24.1 
20.0 
6.0 
21.3 
33.2 
49.6 
12 
24 
70 
115 
3.1 
2.2 
4.0 
4.4 
11  41 
28  100 
40 
40 
2.7  10.7 
2.6  9.2 
2.3 
1.7 
(1)  Production of USSR in 1938 and 1955 estimated; provisions for 1965 and 1975 
not available. 
(2)  Converted into HCE at the ratio of 10:7 to facilitate comparison with the 
other tables; excluding natural gas liquids. 
(3)  These figures do not include the output of the newly discovered Sahara oil 
reserves, which are estimated at about 10 Mt HCE for 1960 and about 40 Mt HCE for 
1965. Realization of these reserves  would  considerably mitigate Europe's energy supply 
problem in the years immediately ahead. 
Energy Supplies of the Euratom Countries during the Last Twenty Years. 
3.  In 1935-36 the ECSC-Community's gross domestic consumption (l) 
(apparent consumption) of energy amounted to 295 Mt HCE or 2.1 t  HCE 
per head of the population. In 1955 it had risen to 400 Mt HCE or2.45t HCE 
(1)  Gross  domestic  consumption  =  apparent consumption plus variations in 
stocks held by producers; Net imports =  gross domestic consumption minus indigenous 
production. 
-45-per head. Between 1950 and 1955 the energy consumed had risen by 36~/o 
while the gross national product rose 34o/ 0 • 
1936(1)  1950  1955 
Consumption. . . • • • • . . • • • • • . . . . • • . • . . . • . . . . • . . . . • • • • •  295 
Indigenous production  • • • . . . . . • • • • . . . . • . • • . . . • • • . • • • .  275 
Net imports. . . . . . . • • • . • . . . . • • • • . . . • • . • • . . • • • • . • • • . . .  20 
(Mt HCE) 
293 
261 
32 
400 
316 
84 
Within this development there has been a great change in the form 
of demand for energy, becoming more and more one for finished products 
such as electricity, gas and refined mineral oils. Thus, the consumption of 
electricity increased  almost  threefold  between  1935  and  1955;  and the 
proportion of mineral oils, which used to he not more than 6-7% of the 
consumption, is now about 20%. 
Even more important is the fact that the six countries are becoming 
more and more net importers of energy. There are two reasons for this. 
First, the extraction of hard coal-hitherto, and still today,  the  ECSC 
countries' most important source of primary energy-is unable to keep up 
with the growth in demand, partly because the reserves of coal are  n~t 
large enough to enable it to do so, partly because in our coal-mining areas 
extraction from deep shafts cannot be easily adapted to a growing demand, 
and lastly also because it is  becoming more and more difficult to obtain 
manpower. The second reason for the increased dependence on imports is 
that in our countries sources of energy other than coal are available only 
to a  limited extent. Some of our countries  have  water  power  resources, 
but those which can be economically exploited have already been largely 
utilized. The deposits of oil and natural gas in our countries are certainly 
not unimportant, but they are by no means sufficient to meet the rapidly 
growing demand for these products. In 1955  the imports of mineral oil 
amounted to about 103 Mt HCE, of which more than 80% came from the 
Middle East. Nearly 22 Mt HCE of liquid fuel were re-exported as finished 
products. 
(1)  Estimated figure for 1936-37; no reliable calculation can he made because of 
the territorial changes which have occurred. 
-46 Future Energy Requirements. 
4.  The following  estimates  of the internal requirements,  indigenous 
production and net imports are based on studies-still not all published-
made by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community 
for the years 1955 to 1965 (1). Further forecasts have been made for 1965 
to 1975 which, however, indicate a  general tendency only. 
The estimates made of the general expansion of the national econo-
mies comprised in the ECSC countries are based on the following hypothe-
ses: a)  the active population will be fully employed throughout the whole 
period and those still unemployed in some countries in 1955 will,  except 
for those seasonally or temporarily out of employment, be absorbed into 
industry; b)  there will be a  high rate of increase in productivity per man/ 
year after allowing for some reduction of weekly working hours  and an 
extension of annual holidays; c)  only the long-term development trend is 
taken into account. 
On these hypotheses the development of the gross national product 
(GNP) is  estim~ted to be as follows: 
1955-1965 
Increase in working population (as% of initial value)...........  6.5 
Annual rate of increase of productivity(%)...................  3.7 
Annual rate of increase in GNP (3) (%).......................  4.3 
(1)  Reference is madein detail to the following studies: 
1965-1975 
3.4 
2.7  (2) 
3.1 
a)  Report of the Mixed Committee of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Com-
munity and the Council of  Ministers (further referred to as "Mixed Committee') on the 
prospects  and conditions  of general economic  development in the  Community's 
countries (not yet published). 
b)  Report of the Mixed Committee on the structure and trends of the energy economy 
in the Community countries (not yet published). 
c)  Report of the High Authority on the 'General Objectives for Coal and Steel' (further 
referred to as "General Objectives'); published in the General Report of the High 
Authority to the Assembly, April1957. 
(2)  On the assumption that the working year during this period will be reduced by 
3% and productivity per hour increased by an overall 35%. 
(3)  The transition from a high rate of increase in the first ten-year period to a low 
rate in the second is actually a continuous, not a discontinuous process, as might be supposed 
from the figures in the table. As an example, the annual rate of increase in productivity in 
the years from 1965 onwards should approximate 3% or even a little less. 
-47-5.  The estimate of energy requirements is  computed by ascertaining 
the ratio between the changes in such requirements over a period of time 
and changes in the gross national product. The following table shows the 
data used and the results of the estimates compiled by the High Authority 
or the Mixed Committee, as the case may he. 
Total Energy Requirements of the Euratom Countries 
German 
Federal  Luxem- Nether- Six 
Republic  Belgium  France  Italy  bourg  lands  Countrie.1 
(1) 
GNP Index Figures 
1955-1965 
(1955=100)  155  139  149  163  115  138  152 
1965-1975 
(1965=100)  137.5  127  134  142.5  110.6  126.5  135.5 
Ratio of  Changes in Energy Requirements to  Changes in GNP 
1955-1965  0.70  0.70  0.90  1.00  0.95  0.90  0.79 
1965-1975  0.70  0.75  0.95  1.05  0.95  1.00  0.83 
Energy Requirement Indices 
1955-1965 
(1955=100)  138.5  127.3  144.1  163.0  114.2  134.2  141.3 
1965-1975 
(1965=100)  126.2  120.2  132.2  144.6  110.1  126.5  129.8 
Energy Requirements (2) (3) 
(Estimated Apparent Consumption) (Mt HCE) 
1955  182  34  107  47  4  27  400 
1960  214  38  129  59  4  31  475 
1965  252  43  154  76  5  36  566 
1970  286  47  178  92  5  40  648 
1975  318  51  202  110  5  45  731 
(1)  Since the 1st of January 1957, the Sarre Territory belongs to the Federal 
Republic. 1955 figures for the Sarre have been added to the figures of the Federal Republic. 
(2)  The figures in the above Table are slightly different from the data contained in 
the Mixed Committee's report which has not yet been published. Apart from revisions subse-
quently supplied by individual countries, the differences are due to the fact that in our 
calculation the production of  hydro-electric power over the whole period has been computed 
on the basis of an equivalence of 400 g HCE/kWh. This corresponds to the specific fuel con-
sumption prevalent in 1956 in modern thermal power stations. 
(3)  Figures for 1960 and 1970 are interpolated. 
-48-According to this estimate the six countries' energy requirements 
over the period 1955-1965 will rise by about 3.5% annually and over the 
period 1965-1975 by about 2.6%. The reasons for adopting these rates of 
increase as a basis for further analysis are the following: 
a) The Mixed Committee estimates that between 1955 and 1965 the 
gross  national product will rise by 52o/ 0 ,  resulting from 6.5o/ 0  increase in 
population and from 43% increase in productivity. Such an increase in 
productivity, however, can only be achieved with the help of  more abundant 
supplies of energy, especially when it is remembered that in the next few 
years the efforts being made everywhere to shorten hours will prove suc· 
cessful. 
b)  The expansion of national economies will primarily be the conse-
quence of an anticipated rise in industrial production and, as an approxi-
mation, it can be assumed that a rise of about 60% in industrial production 
will correspond to a  50% rise in the national product. The branches of 
industry which are large consumers of power, such as chemicals, will play 
an increasingly prominent part in this process. 
c)  The expansion is accompanied by a  growing urbanization, which 
means a rise in domestic energy consumption. 
d)  Agriculture is entering an era of mechanization and will become 
a relatively bigger consumer of energy than hitherto. 
In general, the energy situation in the six countries is  coming to 
resemble that in the United States and also in the United Kingdom with 
its distinguishing feature of a  high rate of consumption per head of popu-
lation. 
Growth of Domestic Energy Supply. 
6.  Estimates of the indigenous production of primary energy are diffi-
cult to establish, on account of the varying evaluation of reserves in the 
case of oil and natural gas, and of future production conditions in the case 
of hard coal. 
For hard coal we have adopted in the first place the estimates of the 
'General Objectives' Committee, which are based on an optimistic hypothe-
sis.  This  hypothesis  takes  into  consideration  all  the  workable  deposits 
already existing and assumes that, in spite of the tendency to reduce the 
working week and to lengthen annual holidays, the number of days  of 
-49-production per year will in future  be  300; it is further estimated that 
output per man and underground shift can be expected to rise by 30% in 
20 years. The figures thus computed give the maximum productive capaci-
ty, if some 30 new pits are opened. A conservative estimate is based on the 
assumption that it will not be possible to compensate the expected reduction 
in the working week; and that the trend of future production will be re-
flected in a reduction of the number of days per year actually worked fron1 
300 to 260. 
In the case of brown coal it is assumed that maximum use will be 
made of the existing deposits and tha.t all the extra crude coal produced is 
used as fuel in power stations (more particularly, in the case of brown coal 
from the Rhineland). 
In the case of hydro-electric resources that can still be expanded the 
assumption made is that of maximum exploitation. 
The estimates for the future of oil and natural gas are less reliable; 
in this  case the data obtained from  the individual countries  have been 
adopted. The future production from oil deposits in the Sahara is treated 
statistically as part of the imports of the six countries. 
Finally, the Mixed Committee has made an estimate of the probable 
development of indigenous production, which comes more or less halfway 
between the optimistic and the conservative hypothesis. We have adopted 
these figures  also, subject, however, to the variation that maximum use 
is made of available water power resources (1). 
The following table gives the results of the calculations. Figures for 
the separate countries will be found in the tables at the end of this Annex. 
Production of Primary Energy in the Euratom Countries 
(Mt HCE) 
1955  1960  1965  1970 
Optimistic estimate 
Hard coal ..............•....•..  243.3  262  285  300 
Brown coal .....................  28.5  32  40  45 
Oil ............................  7.5}  24  40  55 
Natural gas .....................  5.5 
Hydro-electricity .............•..  30.9  35  45  50 
Total ......•••.•.........  315.7  353  410  450 
.l975 
320 
49 
71 
56 
496 
{1)  This is one of the basic factors determining the magnitude of a nuclear power 
programme (see Annex III). 
-50-Production of Primary Energy in the Euratom Countries 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Conservative estimate 
Hard coal ......................  243.3  245  250  262  277 
Brown coal ....•..........••....  28.5  32  40  45  49 
Oil ............................  7.5}  23  36 
Natural gas ......•....•.........  5.5  34  43 
Hydro-electricity •..•..••...•.•.•  30.9  35  45  50  56 
Total •••..••••.•......••.  315.7  335  369  393  425 
Estimate of Probable Indigenous Production 
Hard coal ......................  243.3  254  265  279  293 
Brown coal ••••...•••..•...•••••  28.5  32  40  45  49 
Oil ............................  7.5  13  19  24  29 
Natural gas .........•...........  5.5  10  15  18  22 
Hydro-electricity ......•.........  30.9  35  45  50  56 
Total •..•................  315.7  344  384  416  449 
7.  As a result of deteriorating conditions in the coal seams and of the 
increasing use that is being made of machinery in coal mining, the extrac· 
tion of hard coal with a high ash content will rise. Similarly, as a result of 
more intensive preparation of run-of-mine coal, the proportion of so-called 
middlings and slurry will increase. We define slack with a high ash content, 
middlings and slurry together as 'low-grade coal'. 
Production of Low-grade Coal in 1955 
Federal Republic ............  . 
Belgium  .•.•••........•..... 
France .....•....•....•.....• 
Netherlands ••..•..••••.....• 
Actual Tonnage 
(millions) 
18.0 
8.3 
11.6 
1.5 
39.4 
Percentage of total 
coal production 
12 
28 
21 
12 
15.7 
Because of  its high percentage of ash and other unfavourab]e physi-
cal characteristics, low-grade coal is not suitable for long-distance transport 
and is therefore earmarked for use in pithead power stations (its caloric 
value is taken as 4,300 Kcal/kg as against 7,000 Kcal/kg for ordinary coal). 
Utilization in this way also fits in with the efforts being made for the elec-
trification of coal-mining operations. The 'General Objectives' Committee 
has evaluated the share of low-grade coal in future production and has 
-51-taken as a basis the assumption that more particularly in the West German 
coal mines, seams high in low-grade coal will in future be worked more 
intensively. If the percentage figures  as estimated by this Committee are 
applied to the probable production estimates, the output of low-grade coal 
will be as follows: 
Probable  Probable Output of Low-grade Coal 
Total Coal  %of Total  Actual  Converted 
Production  Production  Tonnage  into HCE 
{Mt)  {Mt)  {Mt) 
1955  243  15.7  39.4  23.3 
1960  254  16.3  41.4  24.8 
1965  265  17.4  46.1  27.7 
1970  279  17.5  48.5  29.1 
1975  293  17.6  51.6  31.0 
These figures  cannot be related directly to the output of electricity 
from pithead power stations given in Annex IV (para. 4), because part of 
the low-grade coal is used for other purposes. 
Net Imports of Euratom Countries. 
8.  The six countries' net imports, reckoned as the difference between 
domestic consumption and indigenous production, will even on the opti-
mistic estimate of production, be in 1965 almost double and in 1975 nearly 
three times the 1955 figure. 
Net imports 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Optimistic  estimate  of  indigenous 
production. 
(Mt HCE) •...............  84.3  122  156  193  235 
% .•.....................  21.0  26.7  27.6  30.0  32.2 
Conservative estimate of indigenous 
production. 
(Mt HCE) •.........••....  84.3  140  197  250  306 
% •.•....................  21.0  29.5  34.8  38.9  41.9 
The figures so computed embody a number of fortuitous and doubt-
ful factors which will probably be magnified as the period under consider-
ation is extended. On the long-term view it is advisable to take as a basis 
the probable trend of production (see para. 6). 
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FIGURE  C 
Net energy imports of individual countries 
1960  1965  1970  1975 Probahle Trend of Net Imports 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Estimated consumption 
(Mt HCE)  ...............  400  475  566  648  731 
Indigenous production 
(Mt HCE) ....•.....•.....  316  344  384  416  449 
Net imports 
(Mt HCE) ................  84  131  182  232  282 
Net imports 
(%) .•..•••....••..•...•.•  21.0  27.5  32.2  35.9  38.6 
On this basis it would seem that at present the ECSC countries' 
net imports of  energy amount to just about 100 Mt HCE or 23% of  domestic 
consumption; in ten years they will he roughly 200 Mt HCE or 33% of 
estimated consumption; and in twenty years will he around 300 Mt HCE 
or about 40% of estimated consumption-all this in the absence of nuclear 
energy (See Figs. A and D). 
The  share  of net  imports  in total requirements (estimated con-
sumption) varies from country to country, according to the level of in-
digenous production. In the next ten or twenty years the extent to which 
countries depend on imports will he altered. The most far-reaching change 
,viii  he that affecting the  German Federal  Republic which now has an 
evenly balanced energy trade account. In 1965, however, she will probably 
need net imports of 38 Mt HCE or 15% of total requirements, and in 1975 
they may reach 72  Mt HCE or nearly a  quarter of her consumption. As 
Fig. C shows, the deterioration of her foreign trade balance in the matter of 
energy supplies is  progressing more rapidly than in any other Euratom 
country. Detailed figures of the energy balance for each country are given 
at the end of this Annex. 
Comparison with O.E.E.C. Estimates. (1) 
9.  Our estimates for energy requirements and production differ to a 
certain extent from those published in the O.E.E.C. Report on 'Europe's 
Energy Requirements', which are as follows: 
Maximum .........  . 
Mean .......•...... 
Minimum •.••...... 
1955  1960  1975 
100 
100 
100 
118 
115 
112 
178 
165 
150 
(1)  'Europe's  Growing  Needs  of Energy-How Can They Be Met?' O.E.E.C., 
A Report Prepared by a Group of Experts, May 1956. 
-54-The O.E.E.C. estimate involves a 3o/ 0  annual increase for the period 
1955-1975 according to the maximum estimate, and a 2.5°/ 0  annual increase 
according to the mean estimate. The Mixed Committee estimates the annual 
rates of increase for the E.C.S.C. at 3% for 1955-1975. Deviations between 
the estimates exist for the first period. O.E.E.C. assumes an annual rate of 
3% for 1955-60, whereas the Mixed Committee assumes 3.5% for 1955-65. 
The O.E.E.C.  report does not give full  particulars for individual 
countries, so its estimates can only be compared indirectly, by subtracting 
an independent estimate for Great Britain and our own estimate for the 
six countries from the O.E.E.C. maximum estimate, to see if the balance 
left  for  other  O.E.E.C.  countries  appears to be reasonable.  For energy 
requirements, this gives the following figures: 
1955  1960  1975 
(Mt  HCE) 
O.E.E.C. estimate for all countries .••.......•.•..•...  730  860  1 300 
Estimate for Great Britain (I) ......•.........•......  250  275  363 
Present estimate for six countries ...••.......•..•.•..  400  475  731 
Other O.E.E.C. countries (by difference) .•............  80  110  206 
For indigenous production of primary energy, the same procedure 
gives the following figures: 
1955  1960  1975 
(Mt HCE) 
O.E.E.C. estimate for all countries •••..•...••••••••..  584  645  755 
Estimate for Great Britain .........................  222  230  255 (2) 
Present estimate for six countries .....•••..........•.  316  344  449 
Other O.E.E.C. countries (by difference) •...•........•  4:6  71  51 
It is apparent that the O.E.E.C. maximum estimate is in line with 
that of the present Report for requirements, but much more cautious with 
respect to indigenous production. 
Demand for Specific Types of Energy. 
10.  The demand for energy is to some extent a demand for specific kinds 
of energy: coking plants require  coal;  automobiles and aeroplanes need 
liquid fuel. Much of the demand for energy, however, can he met by coal 
or by oil. In this field, which covers heating requirements for industry and 
(1)  G.  H.  Daniel  'Britain's  Energy  Prospects';  the Viscount Nuffield Paper; 
15  December 1955. 
(2) Daniel, op. cit.,  gives no estimate for 1975; the figure given above is that  for 1970. 
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households and the thermal production of electricity, the various types of 
energy compete with one another. 
The High Authority's memorandum defining the 'General Objectives 
for Coal and Steel' and the Mixed Committee's studies on power economy 
give estimates of energy requirements by types which are reproduced in 
the following table. In these estimates no allowance has yet been made for 
nuclear energy. The demand of the final consumers for electricity is con-
sidered, in this case, as a specific energy demand. 
Types of Energy required for Specific Consumer Needs 
1955  1965  1975 
(Mt HCE)  %  (Mt HCE)  %  (Mt HCE)  % 
Specific requirements: 
Electricity (1) ........  92  23.0  161  28.5  253  34.5 
Hard coal (2)  ........  114  28.4  144  25.4  168  23.0 
Oil (3)  ..............  21  5.3  41  7.2  63  8.6 
Non-specific  requirements  173  43.3  220  38.9  247  33.9 
Total requirements  ••••••  400  100.0  566  100.0  731  100.0 
The  following  deductions  may be  drawn  from  this  table,  which 
provides only rough indications of requirements: 
a)  The share of electricity in the total amount of energy consumed 
will rise 50% by 1975 (in terms of HCE). 
b)  Specific requirements in hard coal are estimated to rise by 54 Mt 
HCE  by 1975.  Its share in the total amount  of energy  consumed will 
decline, but the absolute increase exceeds that which can be anticipated in 
hard coal production ('probable' estimate). 
c)  Non-specific requirements are estimated to rise by 74 Mt HCE 
between 1955 and 1975. 
d) The whole increase in non-specific consumption and in the non-
specific requirements of power stations will have to be met by increased 
imports, except in so  far as  nuclear power takes their place. The future 
structure of consumption in the six countries' energyeconomywill  therefore 
(1)  As a secondary form of energy, the demand for electricity is specific; hut over 
half of it is produced by 'other thermal' power stations, the primary energy consumption of 
which is non-specific (for figures see table at end of Annex IV). 
(2)  Coking coal requirements of coking plants and gasworks plus colleries' own 
consumption. 
(3)  Petrol and diesel oil used by road and air traffic vehicles only. 
-56-he determined mainly by the relationship between the prices of imported 
coal and imported crude or fuel oil. 
Fuel Import Prices. 
11.  If the six countries are going to have to depend more and more on 
imports for their supplies of energy, this cannot fail to affect the cost of 
our energy supplies. The upward price-trend thus induced will become all 
the more noticeable as other countries which are big consumers find them-
selves  obliged to rely increasingly  on imports of energy.  Great  Britain 
would-without its nuclear power programme-have to raise its imports 
of energy from 28 Mt HCE to 108 Mt HCE by 1975. Even the United States 
will have to cover its oil requirements to an increasing extent by imports. 
The Community of the Six is a very big importer of energy, hut at 
the same time it is also an important exporter of refined energy products 
and is earning quite substantial profits on the refining process. In 1955, 
gross imports of energy from third countries amounted already to 14.3% 
of the total goods imports and a fifth of the imports of raw materials and 
feed products. These proportions will rise rapidly; a distinguishing feature 
of the future development will he the shift whicl;t will occur in the compo-
sition of imports as a result of the increasing amounts of energy imported. 
The Euratom Countries' Trade in Energy with third Countries in 1955 
Quantities  Values 
(Mt HCE)  (mill.$)  ($/t HCE) 
Total imports: 
Hard coal ....•............................  22.9 
Crude oil  ................................  .  92.8 
Refined oil ..............................•.  9.6 
Total  125.3  1,946  15.8 
Total exports: 
Solid fuel (coke, etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18.9 
Liquid fuel (refined oil)  . . .. . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .  21.7 
Total ..•..............•...............  40.6  895  23.9 
Balance: 
Solid fuel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.0 
Liquid fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80.7 
Total ................................  .  84.7  1,051  8.1 
-57-Computed foreign trade values for 1955 cannot he considered sig-
nificant for the future because they reflect neither the increase of import 
demands since then nor the growth of requirements to be expected in the 
future. During the first six to nine months of 1956 the import prices were 
$ 2.5 per ton HCE higher than the corresponding figures of 1955. 
The prices of imported coal and fuel oil are related; they compete 
directly on the Eastern Seaboard of  the United States. In 1956, for instance, 
f.o.b. prices of coal were$ 12-13/ton, and quotations for bunker Coil were 
near $ 10/ton (converted into HCE); allowing for subsequent increases in 
oil prices, and a somewhat stabler coal market, representative f.o.b. prices 
appear to he$ 12/ton for coal and$ 11/ton for oil. In the future, the antici-
pated steep rise of U.S. oil imports may well modify this relationship. 
Long-term freight rates for shipment of coal from the United States 
to Europe may be assumed to settle down in the neighbourhood of$ 8/ton, 
with a corresponding figure for oil of$ 5/ton (HCE). This would give c.i.f. 
prices of $ 20/ton for coal and $ 16/ton for oil.  To these prices must be 
added charges for handling and inland transport of about $ 2/ton, giving 
prices of$ 22/ton for coal and$ 18/ton for oil delivered to consumers near 
ports. In practice, this difference may tend to narrow in the future. Al-
though fully realizing the uncertainties of  such forecasts, we think it  reason-
able for present purposes to take a  delivered price of$ 20/ton (HCE) for 
energy imports of the six countries. 
A  specific  demand  for  American  coking  coal,  and traditional  o:r 
technical preferences for coal on the part of some groups of  consumers, even 
in the future, may tend to increase coal imports appreciably. But it must 
be concluded from the comparison of prices made above that the future 
increase in energy imports of the six countries will tend to a  very great 
extent to take the form of oil rather than of coal. 
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1975 Tables showing Energy Balances of Individual Countries {1) 
(Mt HCE) 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
GERMAN  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC 
Estimated Consumption .•.........  181.7  214  252  286  318 
Probable  Production: 
Hard coal ............•.....  148.8  155  163  173  184 
Brown coal ....•............  27.2  30  36  40  46 
Oil  ........................  4.5  5  6  6  6 
Natural gas + peat ..........  1.0  1  2  2  3 
Hydro-power ................  4.8  5  7  7  7 
Total •......•••........  186.3  196  214  228  246 
Net imports ..•••......••••..•...  -4.5  18  38  58  72 
As % of consumption •...........  -2.5  8.4  15.1  20.2  22.6 
BELGIUM 
Estimated Consumption ......•..•.  33.6  38  43  47  51 
Probable  Production: 
Hard coal ..................  29.4  30  31  32  34 
Hydro-power ...............  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Total •......•.•........  29.5  30.1  31.1  32.1  34.1 
Net imports ......•.•......•...••  4.2  8.0  12  15  17 
As % of consumption .........•..  12.5  21.1  27.9  31.9  33.4 
FRANCE 
Estimated Consumption ...••.....•  107.0  129  154  178  202 
Probable  Production: 
Hard coal ..•.....•.........  52.2  55  58  60  62 
Brown coal ..........•••....  1.2  2  2  2  2 
Oil (2)  .....................  1.3  5  9  12  16 
Natural gas .................  0.4  3  6  9  12 
Hydro-power ...............  10.2  14  20  23  28 
Total .•....•...........  65.3  79  95  106  120 
Net imports .•••.....••..•.....•.  41.7  50  59  72  82 
As % of consumption ............  39.0  38.8  38.3  40.4  40.6 
(1)  The figures are taken mainly from national data. However, it is assumed that 
the fullest use is made of the available waterpower resources. 
(2)  The estimate of  indigenous consumption does not take into account the futur·e 
production of oil in the Sahara. 
-60-Tables showing Energy Balances of Individual Countries (1) 
(Mt  HCE) 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
ITALY 
Estimated Consumption .........•.  46.4  59  76  92  llO 
Probable  Production: 
Hard coal ..................  1  1  1  1  1 
Brown coal .................  0.2  0.6  1  1  1 
Oil  .........................  0.3  1.4  3  4  5 
Natural gas .................  4.3  7  8  8  8 
Hydro-power, Geothermal ....  13  16  19  20  21 
Total ...................  18.8  26  32  34  36 
Net imports •....................  27.6  33  44  58  74 
As % of consumption ...........•  59.5  56.0  57.9  63.0  67.3 
LUXEMBOURG 
Estimated Consumption ...........  4  4  5  5  5 
Indigenous  Production: 
Hydro-power  ................  0  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Net imports •..............•.....  4  3.7  4.7  4.7  4.7 
As % of consumption ............  100  92.5  94.0  94.0  94.0 
NETHERLANDS 
Estimated Consumption ...........  26.7  31  36  40  45 
Probable  Production: 
Hard coal ..................  12.0  12  12  12  12 
Oil  .............. ··········  1.5  2  2  1.5  1.5 
Natural gas .................  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4 
Total ..................  13.7  14.3  14.3  13.9  13.9 
Net imports •....................  14  16.7  21.7  26.1  31.1 
As % of consumption ............  52.4  53.9  60.2  65.2  69.1 
(1) The figures are taken mainly from national data. However, it is assumed that 
the fullest use is made of the available waterpower resources. 
-61-ANNEX II 
NUCLEAR  POWER PROSPECTS 
Reactor Types 
1.  The rapidity of nuclear development, and the publicity which has 
accompanied its remarkable success, have made it difficult for experts and 
laymen alike to judge objectively the problems and the probable cost of the 
first nuclear stations. Now that a  dozen or more central station nuclear 
power plant prototypes are in course of construction or in an advanced 
stage of design, the possibilities of economic nuclear power can be assessed 
with some confidence. 
The best routes have not yet been firmly established, and experts are 
confident that radical advances will be realized within the next ten years. 
But already now nuclear electricity is produced commercially. In view of 
the very favorable prospects ahead, any big nuclear power programme has 
to be very flexible, and must pursue short-term and longer-term develop-
ments in close association with commercial application. For the beginning 
of such programmes there are however two classes of reactor available now; 
and even they will be improved considerably during the next ten years. 
(a) PWR/BWR: The American pressurized-water reactor PWR prototype 
at Shippingport (near Pittsburgh) is due to come into operation in 
about six months, and several improved units of around 140 eMW (1) 
capacity are in course of construction or design. The prime-mover 
for the nuclear submarine Nautilus is of this type, and it has on this 
account had the benefit of a very thorough engineering development. 
The civilian power version is fueled with uranium having an average 
concentration of U-235 from 2 to 4 times that of natural uranium. 
The boiling water reactor BWR is a variant of PWR which avoids 
(1)  The abbreviation eMW is used to distinguish the net electrical capacity of 
nuclear plants from their heat rating, which is often expressed in mega-Watts. 
-63-the latter's high vessel pressure, and permits steam to be used direct-
ly in turbines or passed through an intermediate boiler stage depend-
ing on the exact design. Its fuel element design and circuit technology 
are closely akin to PWR, and experience with its 5 eMW prototype 
at Argonne is very encouraging. A large (180 eMW) unit is now under 
construction. 
Detailed  engineering  and  cost  considerations  will  determine  the 
optimum steam content of the water leaving the core, and the ratio 
of heat transferred to primary and secondary steam circuits, so the 
PWR and BWR approaches may well tend to coalesce in the course 
of development. 
(b)  PIPPA: The British gas-cooled reactor prototype at Calder Hall has 
been working very successfully for the last six months, and several 
two-reactor stations of approximately 300 eMW are under construc-
tion for the electricity authorities. This type was adopted in the U.K. 
because it involved a  high proportion of conventional engineering, 
while promising great scope for future improvement; it was capable 
of operation on natural uranium, thereby avoiding a  claim on ura-
nium enriched in U -235; and it lent itself to production of military 
plutonium with power as a by-product (although this no longer ap-
plies to the commercial stations). 
Two further types may be ready for construction of full-scale units during 
the next 3 or 4 years: 
(a)  ENRICHED PIPPA: A  gas-cooled graphite reactor with moderately 
enriched fuel is the next obvious stage for PIPPA, but it has not yet 
been designed in detail. Moderate enrichment offers greatly increased 
fuel burn-up; and unlike natural uranium it can support cladding 
(e.g.  stainless steel) and alloying materials capable of much higher 
temperature duty. This would raise both rating and efficiency, and 
so reduce capital as well as operating costs. 
(b)  HWR: The heavy water type has attained a well-advanced basic tech-
nology largely as a result of Canadian work at Chalk River, and of  its 
close ties with the PWR development. Its  engineering is less advanced, 
but several prototypes are now in course of design  and  develop-
ment in the U.S. and Canada. The heavy water moderated reactor 
-64-makes possible very high utilization of natural uranium fuel without 
recycle; and, if  the coolant can be contained in tubes instead of a 
high pressure  shell,  this  offers  the possibility  of very large  unit 
capacities. 
2.  PWRJBWR and PIPPA are the only immediately available full-
scale designs, and their initial costs and uncertainties are expected to he 
very comparable. Each approach has potential advantages and scope for 
development that makes it important to gain the fullest experience now by 
construction of big plants of both types. But Europe's requirement for 
power reactors differs in important respects from that of the U.S. and the 
U.K. Urgent consideration must be given to the further evolution of these 
designs to suit Europe's needs, with respect to their methods of fueling in 
all its implications, as well as to the primary objectives of  cost reduction and 
reliability. This may well entail the addition within the next few years of 
heavy water systems as a third main line when their development problems 
are  solved,  and  preparation  of a  PIPPA  design  with  optimum  U -235 
enrichment, since both promise favorable fuel cycles with straight-forward 
engineering requirements, and appreciable cost reductions. It  is also very 
important to develop means of  using plutonium as fuel in power reactors, in 
order to decrease the requirements for enriched uranium. 
3.  Other types of reactors which show less promise of favorable costs 
in the near future,  or have  a  long and perhaps uncertain development 
period ahead of them yet, are among others the sodium-graphite, organic 
cooled  (and moderated), fast plutonium breeder, aqueous homogeneous, 
liquid-metal fuel, and high-temperature gas-cooled reactors. Some of these 
types have especially good long range promise when their development 
problems are solved. 
Active work is already under way in some of our countries both on 
the earlier reactor types and on types of long-term promise. France has 
completed since 1948 the reactor G 1 at Marcoule and five research reactors, 
and is currently building three large-scale gas-cooled power reactors, two at 
Marcoule and one at Chinon, which will feed a total of 160 eMW into the 
E.D.F. grid. She is planning a large programme of future additions to this 
capacity. Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgilim are installing PWR/ 
BWR type reactors with light or heavy water coolant. And all five have 
-65-atomic energy development programmes, in various degrees, studying such 
advanced types as homogeneous, fast breeder, high temperature gas-cooled 
and others. 
Nuclear Costs. 
4.  It is important when considering nuclear power costs that the terms 
be properly defined. One is dealing with a situation where a power station 
which is in the planning stage now, will be completed within three to five 
years, and may operate for twenty years or more thereafter. The cost of 
operation will be higher during the initial phase than once the stable opera-
ting condition is reached, but this phase can be expected to last only one or 
two years. From then on, the cost will continue to decrease slowly with im-
provements in fuel element fabrication costs and irradiation time, even in a 
reactor already built; until eventually maintenance costs rise to end its 
useful life. One is dealing with a period of  perhaps thirty years from the time 
of initial planning, during the last twenty-five of  which the cost will be vary-
ing from a high initial level to a lower limit due to fuel cycle improvements. 
Thus for nuclear power plants completed in 1965, to be compared with 
conventional plants for  the same period,  one  should really compare an 
average cost of the nuclear plant over its whole life with the average cost of 
a conventional plant on the same basis. When costs are quoted this is usual-
ly what is actually meant; this is the procedure adopted in the following 
calculations. In Fig. B, the average cost over the life of the plant is plotted 
against the actual startup date of the plant. This is especially significant 
when allowance is  made for the rising cost of conventional fuels and the 
expected fall of nuclear fuel costs over the life of both types. 
Performance data and estimates for the cost of electricity generated 
are tabulated below for three specific power projects, which are representa· 
tive  of the  reactor types now ready for commercial application-PWR, 
BWR and PIPPA. These tables are based on the best available published 
information. The greatest uncertainties in the next 2 or 3 years center on 
initial plant construction costs and fuel burn-up; the published figures·used 
represent the objectives of the plant designers, though the first reactor or 
the first set of fuel elements may not reach these goals. 
The estimates do not apply to small plants, which have higher invest-
ment costs per kW and much higher power costs. 
-66-Reactor Characteristics 
PWR(a)  BWR (b)  PIPPA (c) 
(Yankee)  (Dresden)  (Hunterston) 
Rated total thermal power (MW)  .•...•  480  627  530 
Gross electricity output (  eMW) ..••...•  143  192  168 
Net electricity capacity (  eMW) .•......  134  180  150 
Overall thermal efficiency(%) .........  27.9  28.7  28.4 
Steam pressure (psia) .................  36.56  67.85/33.4  41.48/11.25 
Specific power (MW heat/tonne U) ....•  19.7  11.5  2.1 
Fuel in  reactor (tonnes U)  .......•••..  24.4  54.5  251 
Total fuel inventory (tonnes U) {e)  ••.•.  51  82  310 
U -235  assay of fresh fuel (kg/tonne U) .  26.0  15.0  7.1 
Fuel exposure (MWDJtonne)(f) ......•.  8,000  10,000  3,000 
U-235 assay of spent fuel (kg/tonne U)  •  19.0  5.5  4.4 
Load factor(%) (g) .....•••.......•.•  80  80  80 
Fuel throughput (tonnes Ujyear)  ......  17.5  18.3  51.5 
Total plutonium production (kg/year)  ..  85  100  93 
~ 
Stainless  Zirconium  Magnesium 
Fuel form .••...•..•••........•....••  Tube  Tube  Cam 
~  uo2  ou2  U metal 
Capital cost of plant ($  m.) {h)  ........  39.2  45.0  52.5 
Interest during construction($ m.) ....•  5.9  6.8  7.9 
Total capital cost($ m.) ..............  45.1  51.8  60.4 
Specific capital cost ($/k  W) ...........  340  290  400 
NOTES 
(a)  See  A.S.M.E.  Paper No. 56-A-166- 'The Yankee Atomic Electric Plant' (capital cost 
adjusted on basis of private communication). 
(b)  See A.S.M.E. Paper No. 56-A-169- 'The Dresden Nuclear Power Station'. 
(c)  See Nuclear Engineering, February 1957. (Figures are for half of a two-reactor station). 
(d)  Dual steam cycles. 
(e)  Inventory allows 18 months out·of·pile for PWR and BWR; but 14 months for PIPPA, 
because the latter will feed and discharge fuel continuously. 
-67-(f) The fuel burn-up limits shown are the designer's estimate of average burn-ups that 
appear achievable for the fuel considered during the steady operation of the plant. 
These limits are set by one or more of the problems of irradiation damage, corrosion or 
reactivity. From an irradiation damage standpoint the present state of knowledge is 
based on limited results from successful experiments wherein uranium metal samples 
have been exposed to over 3,000 MWD/T and uranium oxide samples to over 10,000 
MWDfT, hut in both cases the number of samples has  been too  small  to  establish 
the incidence of fuel element failure. Good statistical data will, in fact, not he estab-
lished  until  several  reactors have been in operation  for  an  appreciable  period  of 
time.  Corrosion  does not appear to he limiting in any of the three designs  shown. 
Reactivity is  not limiting in  any of the  three  designs at the burn-ups shown; it 
becomes  limiting  in  the  PIPPA case  without  enrichment around  3,500  MWD  /T  • 
(g)  The assumption of 80% load-factor may surprise those familiar with the utilization 
generally experienced with conventional plant; hut careful consideration in conjunction 
with the experts we have consulted has satisfied us that nuclear stations will realize 
very high load-factors. Experience with existing reactors indicates  a  physical  avail-
ability of well over 90%; and when allowance is made for despatching shut-downs, at 
times when hydro-spillage or other surplus power having very low incremental costs 
may absorb the whole  of the load within reach, we believe that 80% is a  realistic 
average load-factor to allow for nuclear stations. 
(h)  Plant cost excludes research and development, off-site civil works (such as approach 
roads), purchase of land and interest during construction (shown separately). 
Estimated Cost of Electricity 
(in mills per kilowatt-hour) 
PWR 
Fuel costs: 
Uranium in fresh fuel (a) ....•••••.....  5.8 
Fuel fabrication (b) ...................  1.1 
Chemical reprocessing (c)  ..............  0.4 
Plutonium credit (d) ..................  -0.9 
Uranium credit (e) ......••.•......••..  -3.7 
Net fuel cost ••••..••.•••..•..•••..•  2.7 (/) 
Other operating costs (g) .•.•......•.•.•..•••  1.0 
Fuel inventory charges (h) •...•••.••••••••••  1.3 (/) 
Capital charges (  i) ........................  6.3 
Total cost of electricity  ...............  11.3 
Total plus 25% contingency (j) .........  14.1 
CosT  RANGE  ••• , •••• ,, •••••••  11.3-14.1 
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BWR  PIPPA 
2.1  2.0 
1.7  0.4 
0.3  0.3 
-0.8  -1.0 
(-0.3)  (-0.3) 
3.3 (f)  1.7 
1.0  1.0 
0.8 (/)  0.7 
5.4  7.4 
10.5  10.8 
13.1  13.6 
10.5-13.1  10.8-13.6 NOTES 
(a)  Uranium  costs  in  fresh  fuel  are  based  on  the  schedule  of charges  for  enriched 
material announced by the U.S. A.E.C. on the 18th November 1956, and on the price 
for natural uranium metal of$ 40/kg announced 8th August 1955. 
(b)  Fabrication costs for PWR stainless steel elements$ 60/kg U, and for BWR zirconium 
elements $ 115/kg U, including the cost of conversion of UF6 to U02 and scrap re-
covery, and allowing all operation and overhead charges for fuel fabrication plant on a 
production basis. In the case of PIPPA, a charge of$ 9/kgu is allowed for fabrication 
from metal, being the difference between the price of$ 17,500/tonne for fuel elements 
quoted  by the  U.K.  A.E.A.  and  the  cost  of the uranium at$ 40/kg. The price of 
$  20,000/tonne  often  quoted in  this  connection is the U.K.  A.E.A.'s estimate of a 
long-term maximum value, including allowance for possible increases in the cost of 
uranium metal and of improved canning materials and fabrication of fuel elements. 
(c)  The cost of recovery from PWR and BWR irradiated fuel of plutonium and uranium 
in the form of nitrate is based on the charge of$ 15,300/day announced by the U.S. 
A.E.C. on 18th February 1957 for a  1 ton/day plant. These charges assume a plant 
capacity of 300 tonnesfyear and include waste disposal, but not transport (shipment 
to the U.S. for processing would cost about 0.2 millsfkWh). In the case of PIPPA the 
U.K. A.E.A.  estimate of £ 2,500/tonne for  a  plant to process  2,000  tonnesfyear of 
Magnox-clad elements is assumed. 
(d)  The plutonium recovered from PWR and BWR fuel elements is credited at the price 
of $ 12/gm metal announced by the U.S. A.E.C.  on 18th November 1956,  less  the 
official  charge of $1.50/gm for conversion of nitrate to metal. For PIPPA the U.K. 
A.E.A. value of£ 5,000/tonneplus £ 2,500/tonne for reprocessing is assumed; this gives 
$ 11. 70/gm for nitrate. 
(e)  The uranium recovered is credited according to the U.S. A.E.C. schedule announced 
18th November 1956 in the case of PWR. The bracketed credits for BWR and PIPPA 
are not allowed in the net fuel cost, because they are calculated by linear extrapolation 
of the published schedule below natural uranium concentration. In all cases, an esti-
mated charge of $ 3/kg U for conversion from nitrate to UF  6 is deducted. 
(/)  This difference of fuel costs and inventory charges is a  consequence of fuel element 
design, not of differences between the two reactor types. 
(g)  Operating costs assume$ 7/kW-year for operation, maintenance and stores in all cases, 
giving 1.0 mills/kWh at 80% load-factor. 
(h)  Fuel inventory is charged at 8% on the actual value of the fuel throughout its cycle, 
including fabrication, transport, storage, in pile, cooling, transport and processing. 
(i)  Capital charges of 13% are assumed as an average representative of conditions in the 
six countries, covering interest and depreciation (over 15  years) and overheads, but 
excluding taxes and special nuclear risk insurance. (Provisional U.S.  domestic rates 
for special nuclear insurance would come to about 0.2 mills/kWh, subject to revision 
based on experience at the end of ten years). 
(j)  For contingency, see para. 5 below. 
-69 5.  The many variables which must he adopted in such calculations of 
nuclear power costs are often lost sight of, leaving only the final figure in 
mind. To guard against this danger, a  contingency of  25o/ 0  has been added 
to the above estimates of costs, which have been calculated on the basis of 
what appears to he reasonably achievable as average costs during the life of 
plants brought into service early in the 1960's, and the costs then shown as 
a range. This contingency serves to emphasize the actual uncertainties in-
herent in cost estimates made at this time, and it may he interpreted to 
include all adverse elements which might combine to raise costs. For exam-
ple, the 25o/ 0  figure allowed would cover at the same time a rise of 50o/ 0  on 
operation, 25% on fabrication and processing, 15% on plant investment 
(and insurance) and a reduction of irradiation by 25°/ 0 ,  all together. These 
factors are unlikely all to go  in the unfavorable direction, particularly in 
view of improvements in fuel cycle costs. 
6.  On the other hand, these cost estimates take no credit for sources 
of economy which cannot yet be  e~pressed in definite figures.  The first 
commercial  designs  are  necessarily  conservative.  Already the next units 
will  probably incorporate refinements and simplifications and re-optimi-
zation may  increase  capacity  (estimated  at  about  40%  in the case  of 
PIPPA);  so the cost per k W  shoUld be reduced significantly in the near 
future for these reasons. 
The estimates are based on a one-reactor station (half  of  two-reactor 
station in the case of PIPPA); but nuclear stations consisting of several 
reactors of fully 200 MW net electric capacity each should reduce cost per 
kW substantially. 
Plant and erection costs are about 20% lower in some of  our countries 
than in the U.S. and U.K. The nuclear common market provided by the 
Euratom Treaty will promote specialization, and there will be great scope 
for standardization and bulk ordering in a big coordinated programme com-
prising a number of identical reactors of each type. 
Large common plants to fabricate and process fuel elements would 
keep the costs of these operations at a minimum. If  nuclear fuels could be 
supplied at the U.S. domestic use charge (4%), fuel inventory charges would 
be reduced by 0.2 to 0.5 mills/k  W  depending on the reactor type. 
In countries like ours where conventional fuel costs are high, combin-
ing  PWR/BWR  steam  generators  with  conventional  fuel-fired  super-
heaters offers very low incremental costs and fuel consumption reducing 
nuclear costs indirectly. 
-70-7.  In addition to these factors, which will tend to reduce the range of 
power costs of nuclear plants built in Europe during the next ten years be-
low that estimated in para. 4  above, it is generally recognized that these 
reactor types all offer scope for major improvements of plant design and fuel 
cycle economy during this period. Furthermore, the heavy water and en-
riched PIPPA systems may begin to play an important part in European 
conditions from about 1965 onwards, and by the early 1970's some of the 
more advanced types may be expected to come into commercial use. Taken 
together, these developments may realize a  downward trend(l) ofnuclear 
power costs of the sort illustrated in Fig. B. 
Comparison with Conventional Power Costs. 
8.  The competitive status of nuclear power is defined by comparison 
with the costs of new hard-coal and oil stations which it would replace. 
Despite considerable current cost varitions,  this  comparison  for  future 
plants to be built in the six countries can be made on a common basis, be-
cause nuclear costs will be practically the same in all locations. Moreover, 
conventional costs can be calculated on the following generalized assump-
tions: 
a)  All of the fuel for new coal/oil stations will have to be imported 
in all six countries,  so  the present delivered  price of  imported fuel oil of 
$ 20/ton of  equivalent coal can be adopted as a representative average (see 
Annex I, para.ll). The price delivered to sites near ports may in some cases 
he as low as $18/ton, rising to a maximum of $22/ton at sites far inland. 
b)  The net efficiency of big coal/oil stations built in Europe during 
the next few years is likely to be around 33o/ 0  over the life of these plants 
(2,657  kWh/ton of equivalent coal)(2),  giving a  unit fuel  cost of $20.00/ 
2,675  =  7.50 mills/kWh, which must be increased to about 7.7 mills/kWh to 
cover coal and ash handling charges or equivalent costs  associated with 
sulphur and vanadium in the case of heavy oil. The corresponding minimum/ 
(1)  See Davis and Roddis 'The Latest Prospects for Economic Nuclear Power' 
NICB  Conference, Philadelphia, March 14th, 1957; and Hinton 'The Future for Nuclear 
Power', Axel Johnson Lecture, Stockholm, March 15th, 1957. 
(2)  Certain plants will undoubtedly achieve higher net test efficiencies than 33% 
in this period, but when allowance is made for the whole range of plants built (including 
many small extensions), and for some fall-of of efficiency over the life of each plant as it 
operates at lower load-factors and gradually wears out, 33% is considered to be a realistic 
average value. 
-71-maximum range is 7.0 to 8.4 mills/kWh. The upward trend of  imported fuel 
prices (relative to the general price level) must be expected to raise these 
costs by something like one mill per kWh by 1975 despite a further improve-
ment in thermal efficiency. Taxes are not included. 
c)  The capital cost of coal/oil plant varies in the six countries from 
$120/kWh to $170/kW (on a net capacity basis, including all charges except 
interest during construction and taxes). However, if we take into account 
the fact that in some of our countries high interest rates are partly compen-
sated by  lower installation costs, it is permissible to adopt a single represent· 
ative figure of 13% annual charges for interest depreciation and overheads, 
and$ 140/kW for capital cost, which must be increased by 15% to $160/kW 
to  include  interest  during  construction.  This  gives  an  annual  cost of 
$ 21/kW-year (on a net 'sent-out' basis). 
d)  Maintenance and operation costs apart from fuel will not be less 
than$ 4/kW-year for big new base-load plants (1). 
This  gives  the  following  comparison with the nuclear estimates, 
expressed in terms of fixed costs and fuel costs (2) : 
Coal/oil$ 25.00/kW-year + 7.0 to 8.4 mills/kWh (depending on location). 
PWR  :  $  60.00/kW-year +  2.7  mills/kWh 
BWR  :  $  50.00/kW-year + 3.3  mills/kWh 
PIPPA  :  $  63.50/kW-year +  1.7  mills/kWh 
Plus a contingency 
of up to 25% 
At 80% load-factor (i.e. 7000 hours/year) (3), this gives conventional power 
costs of 10.6 to 12 millsjkWh, compared with 11  to 14 millsjkWh for the first 
nuclear plants. In practice, the very low fuel costs of  nuclear plant will keep 
them near the top of load despatching schedules through most of their 
useful life, whereas coal/oil plants with fuel costs of 7 to 9 mills/kWh will 
move down the load schedule as they get older, raising their costs as their 
load-factor falls and the cost of traditional fuels rises. 
(1)  See I.C.A. report 'Economic Aspects of Electric Power Production in Selected 
Countries"-July 1955-page 21. 
(2)  The fixed costs for nuclear plants expressed as $/kW-year can be derived from 
the 'Estimated Cost of Electricity' table by multiplying all unit costs except those for fuel 
by 7000 hours/year (80% load-factor). 
(3) At 70% load-factor conventional power costs would be 0.5 mills/kWh higher9 
and nuclear costs about 1.0 mills/kWh higher. 
-72 Extra Capital Requirements and Obsolescence. 
9.  The investment required in nuclear plants on the basis  given in 
para. 4 above may he compared with that for conventional thermal plants 
as follows (in $/kW): 
PWR  BWR  PIPPA 
Capital for nuclear plant (including interest during con-
struction and fuel inventory) .....................  450  360  460 
Less capital for conventional plant  (including  interest 
during construction) ••.•••••••...•••.•••...•••••  -160  -160  -160 
Extra nuclear investment ••••••...•••••••....••••.•  290  200  300 
Less uranium fuel inventory (actual value through fuel 
cycle including fabrication costs) (1)  .•............  -110  - 70  - 60 
Extra nuclear investment excluding fuel •••...•••••••  180  130  240 
In subsequent calculations it is assumed that half of the reactors built will 
he of the PIPPA type and half PWR/BWR, which gives an average plant 
cost of about$ 350/kW and a fuel inventory of$ 75/kW (of which about 
$ 25/kW is fabrication cost). 
The  rapid  improvement  foreseen  for  nuclear  reactors  might  he 
supposed to make plants built at high costs in the :first years obsolete before 
they 'wear out'. In fact this will not happen, because even the :first reactors 
will have operation, fuel and inventory charges (which are the terminable 
costs) of only 3.5 to 5.0 mills/kWh, and these costs will fall over the plant's 
life as the fuel cycle is improved. So the total cost of future nuclear plants 
would have to he reduced by more than 50% before it would pay to shut 
down an early unit to replace it by a new one. This would not happen within 
the 15 year life allowed in the 13% capital charges assumed. So the first 
nuclear plants will continue to he operated, at the high load-factor which its 
low and falling incremental costs allow, until its maintenance costs and 
outage rise on account of phycisal age to the point where its terminable 
costs justify replacement by a  new plant. This involves no assumptions 
about the future except that new plants built before 1975 will not realize 
total costs below 3.5 to 5.0 mills/kWh. By contrast, the high and rising 
(1)  Calculated from data given in 'Estimated Cost of Electricity' table, p. 68. 
-73-terminable costs of conventional thermal stations (8 to 10 mills/kWh) will 
tend to relegate them prematurely to peak-load and reserve duty. 
Nuclear Fuel Problems. 
10.  It is apparent from the table given in para. 4 that the net cost of 
uranium is practically the same for all three reactor types (2.1  mills/kWh 
for PWR and BWR, and 2.0 mills/kWh for PIPPA). But nuclear fuels raise 
problems of supply as well as of cost, because the U.S. government is the 
only economic source of enriched uranium; such enrichment is essential for 
some reactors and desirable for most others. 
Setting aside the advanced systems, the fuel cycles of reactors suit-
able for application during the next 10 years are all basically alike except 
that the moderator and fertile material employed demand different general 
levels of concentration of fissile  material. 
Operation at a  higher level of enrichment costs more per gram of 
U-235 consumed, and for inventory charges. But this is generally offset by 
higher utilization of the fuel, burning Pu-239 generated to a greater extent, 
':lnd reducing the incidence of fuel fabrication and processing costs. It also 
has significant effects on the materials that can he used (e.g. stainless steel 
is half the c?st of zirconium today), and on reactor rating and efficiency. 
Having selected a given reactor type, it is therefore most important 
that the designer should he free to optimize the concentration of his fresh 
and spent fuel; and in all likely cases this will involve a  fuel feed from a 
diffusion plant to provide a concentration above that of natural uranium, 
at least until the heavy water reactor is available or recovered plutonium 
can he used as an economic alternative source of re-enrichment  ·of depleted 
uranium, so reducing the natural uranium feed. It will also generally pay 
to return the uranium recovered from irradiated elements to a  diffusion 
plant, except insofar as core design calls for a proportion of depleted fuel, 
or if the U -235 content is below the economic rejection level. 
11.  The six countries must envisage the possibility of building a· low 
enrichment diffusion plant for this purpose. However, for the reasons given 
in para. 13 below, future requirements for U-235 are far from certain. In 
these circumstances, it is extremely advantageous to he able to get U -235 
from the American plants at the very favourable terms announced by the 
A.E.C. on 18th November 1956, and so to avoid the high investment and 
-74-electricity consumption of a  diffusion plant until its necessity is  clearly 
established. It is  understood that the A.E.C.  prices are firmly based on 
actual costs, including amortization of total capital investment. But they 
are probably between one-third and one-half of  those which a first plant built 
elsewhere could achieve, on account of  the vast scale of  the American plants, 
the  extremely  low  power  costs  (4  mills/kWh), normal U.S.  government 
finance rates, and perhaps most of all on account of the very highly develop-
ed design and technology. There is, therefore, no basis for apprehension 
about the employment of enriched fuel on the ground that the A.E.G.prices 
are  subsidized and therefore exert an artificial and unreliable effect  on 
design. 
12.  It will always pay to process spent fuel, even if its uranium is too 
depleted to  feed  back to  a  diffusion  plant, because the credit from its 
plutonium content-assuming that the present valuation is  justified by 
development of economic means to re-use it-in all cases exceeds the cost 
of processing, by the equivalent of 0.6-0.8 mills/kWh. Moreover, it will 
pay to do this in Europe. Shipment of shielded spent elements to the U.S. 
or U.K. would cost about 0.2  mills/kWh, whereas the transport cost of 
processed material which no longer needs shielding is negligible. The op-
timum size of a  chemical processing plant, on a throughput basis, is many 
times larger than that of a  single reactor,  so  one plant can serve many 
reactors. An economic throughput for a Euratom processing plant will be 
reached when about one tonne a day of irradiated fuel is being discharged 
from the reactors. On the basis of recent U.S. and U.K. estimates the cost 
of such a plant will be about $ 20 million. The capacity of this plant could 
be doubled,  in due  course,  at an additional  capital  cost  of about $ 10 
million; this would reduce the unit processing cost by 20o/ 0  or more. By the 
time  15  million  kW  is  in  service,  the  processing  load  (assuming  50% 
PWR/BWR and 50o/ 0  PIPPA reactors) will be about 10 tonnes a day. It is 
expected that there will be substantial further reductions in processing 
costs as additional larger facilities are provided to handle this load. Lower 
construction costs in Europe and substantial technical developments in the 
field of fuel processing also will contribute to the lowering of these costs. 
A  problem  associated  with  all  chemical  separation plants  is  the 
handling and disposal of large amounts of radio-active wastes. A safe and 
yet economic solution to this problem is an essential part of a power reactor 
programme. Safe techniques have been developed for storing and disposing 
of wastes in the course of military plutonium recovery. The experts expect 
-75-cheaper methods for disposal of large quantities of  radio-active wastes to be 
developed successfully. The possible recovery and use of radio-active fission 
products, which are now produced on a limited scale but are in increasing 
demand for use by industry, may in the future produce some additional 
revenue. 
13.  Reverting to the question of fuel supply, there are several possibili-
ties of reducing future requirements which could make extremely important 
contributions to Europe's needs after about 1965: 
a)  The heavy water system not only requires less than half of the 
PIPPA reactor's annual make-up of natural uranium, but it is probably the 
most economic way to use uranium below natural concentration. 
b)  There is a possibility for a big coordinated programme to cascade 
uranium from higher enrichment level reactors, via medium level, and on 
the heavy-water plants. This would avoid the cost of multiple conversions 
from nitrate to UF  6 and back to oxide or metal, and would reject the ura-
nium  finally  with  a  very low  U -235  content. As a  consequence, higher 
charges for interest and for  shipment to the U.S. for reprocessing would. 
also be avoided. 
c)  When methods for remote fabrication of plutonium at reasonable 
cost  have been developed, it will  replace fresh  fuel  make-up  almost in. 
proportion to its Pu-239 content. At the same time it would permit oper-
ation of reactors at an enriched level without any uranium enriched in 
U-235, and with reduced natural uranium feed. 
d)  When the equally  difficult  problem of using  U -233  has  been 
solved, the introduction of thorium in place of U -238  will enable some 
classes of reactors to secure a conversion ratio around unity, which would 
reduce annual make-up to very small proportions. 
Location of Nuclear Plants. 
14.  The insignificance of fuel transport costs will permit nuclear plant 
location generally to be optimized more fully than in the case of conven-
tional thermal stations with respect to the geographical distribution of 
electricity loads  and of the transmission net-work and other sources  of 
supply. The choice of particular nuclear sites within the general locations 
so  defined  does,  however, raise certain problems. In particular, reactors 
-76-involve very heavy concentrated loads which impose limitations on foun-
dation conditions. And they require about 50% more cooling water than 
conventional plants (1).  Also,  shipment of irradiated fuel to reprocessing 
plant in heavy lead containers requires good rail facilities, even though the 
tonnages are small. 
However, the most important single factor in the choice of nuclear 
sites in the first years is likely to he safety. A serious  reactor  accident  is 
a  remotely improbable  event (2),  hut dissemination of the  radio-active 
material  contained in a  big power reactor over a  wide area would have 
catastrophic effects if it did occur. The tendency to provide for exclusion 
areas and/or containment vessels, and to locate plants some distance from 
built-up areas, is therefore natural enough in view of our present lack of 
experience. The two experimental reactors which have so far  got out of 
control  in  the  course  of  risky  experiments  caused  serious  damage  to 
equipment and protracted shutdowns, hut neither personnel nor surround-
ings were affected. 
U.K. authorities regard the present PIPPA design to be inherently 
safe on account of its low specific rating and the high thermal capacity of 
the system and, therefore, not to require a  containment vessel. The first 
stations of this type are, however, not being sited in the immediate vicinity 
of large built-up areas. 
U.S. authorities regard the PWR and BWR reactors to he inherently 
safe, particularly on account of their very high negative temperature co-
efficients. Present practice in the U.S. is nevertheless to use containment 
shells for all power reactors, except those built in isolated areas. Cost of 
$ 10 to$ 15 per kilowatt of installed capacity are included for this purpose 
in the estimates for the PWR and BWR. 
No established policy exists in Europe for power reactors. In France, 
two gas-cooled power reactors at Marcoule (G-2  and G-3)  will not have 
containment, whereas one gas-cooled unit located at Chinon (EDF-1) will 
be in a containment shell. 
{1) 28% not  nuclear efficiencyinvolves rejection of  about  67% of  the heat generated, 
compared with about 52% from a conventional plant of 33% net efficiency. 
{2)  See 'Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large 
Nuclear Plants' US AEC March 1957; and statements by US AEC Chairman I.L. Strauss and 
by H. L. Price in hearings before the U.S. Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
on insurance and indemnity legislation on March 25, 1957. 
-77-ANNEX III 
SCOPE  FOR NUCLEAR  POWER 
1.  Production of base-load electricity in big central power stations is 
the only application of nuclear power that can make an important contribu-
tion to the limitation of  energy  imports during the 10-year period with which 
this Report is primarily concerned. Urban district heating schemes may 
employ  nuclear  reactors  in  special  cases,  hut extensive  application  for 
steam-raising or process-heating in industry is unlikely before 1970, because 
small reactors will have power costs much higher than large  ones for  a 
number of years. Nuclear-driven super-tankers may well he another im-
portant secondary development. 
It  is therefore essential to determine the amount of nuclear power 
which the electricity systems of the six countries would he able to accommo-
date.  To  this  end,  the  projections  of requirements  and  production by 
different types of power plant given in Annex IV have been prepared in 
consultation with authorities in each of the six countries. The total figures 
for the six countries are as follows (1): 
(1)  Statistics for capacity are given in all countries at the end of each year, where-
as output is given for the calendar year. However, for the present Report, we have found it 
more convenient to give both capacity and output figures on an end-of-year basis (with out-
put figures corrected for seasonal variations). 
-79 1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Net Capacity (eMW): 
Hydro-electric  ••.•••••••••.•  19 443  23 800  30 040  36 030  43 230 
Blast furnace gas ••••••..••••  1514  1850  2 130  2 450  2 800 
Lignite •. , .•••••••.••••••...  3 678  5 000  7 500  9 700  12 000 
Other thermal (1)  •.•.••...••  26 251  37 900  52 800  73 400  96 500 
Total ••••..•••.•....•••  50 886  68 550  92 470  121 580  154 530 
Net Output (TWhfyear): 
Hydro-electric  .••••...••••••  73  86  107  124  139 
Blast furnace gas •...•••••••.  8  9  11  13  15 
lignite ••..•••••••.•••••••..  20  30  45  58  72 
Other thermal (1)  ...........  90  141  208  302  410 
Total .•••••••...•••••••  191  266  371  497  636 
Fuel Consumption (Mt HCEfyear): 
Other thermal  ••..•••••••..•  48  70  93  130  164 
(1)  This item includes pit-head power plants and cooperative stations of the min-
ing industry which are based largely on low-grade coal. At the end of 1955 their net capacity 
amounted to 4 970 eMW and their output 25  TWh (see Annex I, para. 7 and Annex IV, 
para. 4). 
2.  In the present energy situation, it is  clear that hydro-electricity 
must be exploited to the limit of its capacity, and the above figures rep· 
resent  maximum  programmes  in  all countries. Likewise, the maximum 
possible expansion of lignite production will be devoted wholly to power 
production, for which it is particularly well suited economically. And the 
surplus of gas from blast furnaces has to be used on the spot in power 
stations. So it is the output required from 'other thermal' power stations 
-which will  according to the above estimates have to provide 72% of 
the total rise of electricity from 1955 to 1975-that can be satisfied to a 
greater or lesser extent by nuclear power built instead of hard-coal and 
oil plant. The following table gives more detailed figures for this category 
for the period considered in the Report (the figures are for the end of each 
year): 
-80-End of  Capacity  Load-factor  Output  Fuel consumption 
year  (eMW)  (hours/year)  (TWh/year)  (gmfkWh)  (Mt HCEfyear) 
1960  37 900  3 720  141  500  70 
1961  40 550  3 775  153  490  75 
1962  43 300  3 820  166  480  80 
1963  46 250  3 865  179  470  84 
1964  49 400  3 905  193  460  88 
1965  52 800  3 940  208  450  94 
1966  56 500  3 980  225  440  99 
1967  60 450  4 015  243  430  104 
Scope for Nuclear Power. 
3.  The capacity of 'other thermal' plant which must be brought into 
service each year to meet these requirements is  plotted in Fig.  E. This 
defines the amount of nuclear power which could he accommodated within 
the electricity system of the six countries in these years, quite apart from 
technical and economic limits on the rate of construction achievable in 
practice. 
Fig. E  also includes a rough estimate of the further requirement for 
new capacity to replace old plants which will be taken out of service each 
year. It  would he unrealistic to include this replacement plant in the 'scope' 
for  nuclear power in the ten-year period with which we  are  concerned. 
Moreover, after 1967 there will he a  limit on the output as well as on the 
capacity of nuclear plants, because it will pay to operate them at very high 
load-factors. For this reason, it is unlikely that as much as half of the 'other 
thermal' capacity required by 1975 (estimated to he 96,500 eMW) could he 
nuclear (1). At that level, nuclear plant would already he producing over 
80% of the output needed from this category of power plants, if  they were 
operating 7 000 hours a  year. It will probably he essential to install an 
increasing proportion of specialized reserve and peak-load capacity in con-
junction with a  big nuclear programme-including additions to existing 
(1)  The output estimated to be required from other thermal plants at the end of 
1975 is 410 TWh. If  half of this capacity were nuclear (48,250 eMW), it would produce 338 
TWh at 7 000 hours/year utilization, leaving only 72 TWh to be provided by the other half. 
If  all of the low-grade coal output at that date (31 Mt HCE/year) were used to make electri-
city at a specific consumption of 400  gmfk  Wh, it alone would produce the whole of this 
balance. 
-81-storage hydro-plants, pumped storage, oil-fired V elox boilers and gas tur-
bines. It will probably also pay at this stage to keep old thermal stations 
in reserve service longer, and to extend transmission grid links to provide 
the equivalent of extra reserve capacity, rather than reduce the utilization 
of nuclear plants. 
This also means that the utilization of coal and oil stations built in 
the next ten years will fall steeply when nuclear capacity becomes a  big 
proportion of the total, because their fuel costs will he high (and rising) 
by comparison with nuclear fuel costs (which are expected to fall). 
The 15 million k W Target. 
4.  Within these limits imposed by electricity requirements and supplies, 
allowance must he made not only for the four years required to plan and 
build power stations, hut also for the time required to organize a  great 
new venture still confronting many unknowns, for  physical bottlenecks, 
and for delays which are unavoidable when action depends on the aggre-
gation of many individual decisions by public and private electricity organi-
zations.  This means that, even on a  maximum programme, the rate at 
which nuclear capacity could be brought into service must be expected to 
rise progressively from  a  gradual  start in 1960-61 when the first power 
reactor projects already started may come into service, and then to rise 
more  slowly  after  1965  as  the  limits  defined  in  para. 3 above are ap· 
proached. The form this build-up might take is illustrated in Fig. E. 
This rate of nuclear expansion, which is a practical maximum, would 
involve the installation of 15 million kW of nuclear plant by the  end of 
1967. This has been adopted as a target for Euratom, in order to stabilize 
our energy imports at the earliest possible date. 
This target would release 40-45  million tons of coal equivalent a 
year by 1967-68, when net imports in the absence of nuclear energy would 
reach 205-210 million tons a  year. This would level imports out at about 
165 million tons a year, the point which would otherwise be reached in 1963, 
six years from now. If  nuclear construction continued thereafter in the way 
suggested by Fig. E, the fuel saved might reach 125 million tons a  year 
by 1975. On the basis of  estimates given in Annex I, this would be sufficient 
to hold energy imports at the 165 million tons level in the later period. 
-82-FIGURE  E 
Capacity of thermal electricity plant brought into service each year 
(excluding lignite and gas  stations) 
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5.  The amount of low-grade coal expected to be available for consump-
tion by pit-head power stations by 1967 is about 28 million tons a year (1). 
As the following approximate figures show, there would still be ample scope 
for this material, even if all of it were used for electricity production (all 
figures refer to the end of each year) : 
Nel energy imports of  six countries: 
a) Without nuclear power  .•••...• 
b)  With nuclear power •••••....•• 
Fuel released by nuclear plant •••••••  o  o  o 
Fuel burnt in conventional plants (2) •. o  o 
(1)  Cfo Annex I, para. 7. 
End of 1960  End of 1965  End of 1970 
Mt  HCEfyear 
136 
136 
0 
70 
187 
164 
23 
70 
207 
164 
43 
61 
(2)  Cfo  Annex IV, final summary table. 
-83-Comparison with the British Programme. 
6.  The United Kingdom is the first country that has launched a compre-
hensive nuclear power programme. Its similarity with the target proposed 
for Euratom is encouraging, and the differences between the two cases are 
significant. 
The programme first announced two years ago aimed to complete 
1 500 to 2 000 eMW of nuclear plant in the 10 years to the end of 1965, 
and several industrial groups were formed at that time to design commercial 
versions of the prototype Calder Hall reactor. These designs so increased 
unit reactor capacity and strenghtened confidence in the general approach 
that the Government has recently decided to increase the programme to 
between 5 000 and 6 000 eMW by the end of 1965. Further considerable 
increases of reactor rating are anticipated. 6 000 eMW is 15% of estimated 
system capacity in Great Britain at that date, corresponding to 15 million 
kW for the six countries at the end of 1967 (see Fig. F). This will enable 
British energy imports to be stabilized at their 1960 level (45 million tons 
a year of coal equivalent), compared with leveling-out at 165 million tons 
-in the 1963 level-for the six countries. In terms of electricity 30% of 
total U.K. output will be from nuclear stations by 1965, and the whole 
increase of output from 1960 will be met by nuclear power. The Euratont 
programme would not quite reach this point even in 1967, when 15 million 
nuclear kW would produce 25% of total output. 
7.  Our late start postpones the benefits, but it at least permits the 
rapid advances of reactor technology in these years to be exploited. Not 
being tied to a  single reactor type in these conditions offers an important 
measure of protection in the first years before the best approaches can be 
clearly identified. In particular, access to American U-235 will realize the 
very considerable advantages of enrichment. Also, the fact that about a 
third of total capacity in the six countries is  hydro-electric will make it 
easier to accommodate a big nuclear base-load than in the United Kingdom. 
It will  permit more  of the big proportion of collateral reserve capacity 
which must be installed in conjunction with nuclear plant to take the most 
convenient form of additional storage-hydro kilowatts, and in particular, 
of pumped storage. The necessity for this back-up is recognized in Britain, 
but the physical possibilities are limited by comparison with the Continent, 
and this will probably result in a  higher load-factor for nuclear plant on 
the Continent than in the U.K. 
-84-FIGURE  F 
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8.  Nuclear fuel requirements to realize our target of 15 million k Win ten 
years time can he estimated approximately by assuming for example that 
it comprises about one-half natural uranium reactors and one-half slightly 
enriched uranium reactors;  and that plutonium and U -235  will not he 
recycled on an important scale before 1967. Allowances hav~  been made for 
the time needed to fabricate fuel elements and for the amounts of material 
in process before, during, and after irradiation. 
The quantity of natural uranium required for the total inventory 
for 7 500 eMW of natural uranium reactor capacity (assumed to he PIPPA 
type) would he about 15 000 tons. In addition, the total make-up to the 
·end of the ten-year period (including an advance allowance for the following 
year) would he nearly 9 000 tons, and the make-up needed thereafter for 
7 500 eMW of plant would he about 2 500 tons a year. The combined total 
of inventory and make-up would, therefore, he about 24 000 tons of  natural 
uranium to the end of 1967. At $ 40 per kilogram of uranium metal, this 
would cost about $ 1 000  million,  with an annual fuel  make-up  cost of 
about $ 100 million thereafter. During this period, the French and Belgian 
supplies are expected to increase from 1 200 to 2 500 tons a year and may 
amount to a  total of nearly 15 000 tons. There is every reason to expect 
that intensive prospecting in the six countries will further increase this 
output. The costs of the material will, however, he a factor in determining 
the amount of natural uranium to he imported from other countries. 
The quantity of slightly enriched uranium required for tota1 inven· 
tory for 7 500 eMW of enriched reactor capacity (assumed to he half PWR 
and half BWR types) would he about 1400 tons of uranium containing 
2.6% U-235 and 1 700 tons of uranium containing 1.5% U-235. In addition, 
the total U-235 consumed to the end of the ten-year period (including an 
advance allowance for the following year) would he about 25 tons, and the 
U -235 consumed thereafter would he about 7 tons a year for 7 500 eMW of 
plant. The cost of this material (inventory plus consumption), according 
to the schedule announced by the U.S. A.E.C. on November 18th, 1956, 
would he approximately $ 1 000 million, with an annual fuel make-up cost 
of about$ 100 million thereafter. 
On the same assumptions, the annual fuel hill when 15 million kW 
is in service would he approximately as follows: 
-86-$  m.fyear 
Material consumed (burn-up) . . . . . • • • • • . . . . . • . . • • • . . . • . • . • • . . . • • • • • . . .  200 
Fabrication of fuel elements • • • . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • • . . . • . . . . • • • • • • . . . • . • . .  100 
Inventory charge  • • . . • . . . • • • . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • • . • . • • . • . •  90 
390 
Less plutonium credit after deducting processing cost  • . . • . . . • • • • . • . . • • • •  - 65 
325 
The recovery of plutonium from  15  million k W  of such reactors 
would be about 9 tons a year, equivalent to between 5 and 6 tons of U -235 
make-up. Therefore, development of economic means of  fabrication for fuel 
elements containing plutonium would have an extremely important effect 
on European nuclear fuel requirements, reducing the 7 tons a year of U -235 
consumption to a modest level, and facilitating enrichment of PIPPA-type 
reactors (and possibly even of heavy water reactors of some types). 
9.  It  may be noted that 7 tons of U-235 (in PWR/BWR reactors), or 
2 500 tons ofnatm:al uranium (in PIPPA reactors), would produce the same 
amount of electricity as 20 million tons of coal (or equivalent oil); and that 
in terms of heat content, the U -235 (or natural uranium) costs 17.5 cents/ 
million Btu compared with 71  cents/million Btu for coal at $ 20/ton. 
Investment in Nuclear Power. 
10.  The  capital required  for  15  million kW of nuclear plant can be 
approximated (on the same half-natural, half-enriched assumption) from 
the costs per kW given in para. 9 of Annex II. A conservative average for 
the  first  generation  of nuclear  stations is  $ 350/kW,  including  interest 
during construction but excluding fuel inventory and taxes, and making 
no allowance for reductions of plant cost which can be anticipated for a 
big European programme during the next ten years. This gives  a  total 
investment of $ 5 250 million, compared with $ 2 400 million for the same 
amount  of  conventional  plant  at  $ 160/kW  (including  interest during 
construction). The extra outlay for nuclear plant on this basis is therefore 
$ 2 850 million. Allowing for the progressive type of expansion illustrated 
in Fig. E, and for the fact that expenditure spreads over three years prior 
to coming into service, this excess would build up slowly over the ten years 
-87-to a peak rate of$ 500-600 million about 1965 (ignoring plants to be com-
missioned after 1967); this would he 1.5% of estimated gross investment 
in the six countries in that year. 
In addition, a total of some $ 1 100 million would be tied up in the 
value of nuclear fuel in reactors and other parts of the fuel cycle, including 
the cost of their fabrication into fuel elements. But this inventory invest-
ment is on a  different footing from that in the plants themselves, because 
it represents a non-wasting asset of readily recoverable value; and in sofar 
as Euratom will he the owner and processor of these fuels, they may well 
be financed centrally, as is the practice in the U.S. and U.K. 
Foreign Exchange Effects. 
11.  A substantial part of the first reactors built will have to be imported 
from the U.S. and U.K., including particularly their design and engineering. 
Enquiries in America and Britain indicated that the 'import content' might 
he as high as 50% at the start, hut that it can be expected to fall to a low 
level within a few years when the rate of construction is much higher. Over 
the whole ten years, it is unlikely to exceed 20% of the $ 5 250  million 
invested, of$ 1100 million to he paid in foreign exchange,  with  a  peak 
rate below$ 200 million a year around 1964-65. 
In addition about $ 2 000 million worth of nuclear fuels is required 
for inventory and make-up to the end of 1967, and about$ 200 million a 
year thereafter for  make-up  (less  the credit for plutonium). The import 
cost for fuel would he half of these sums if  Europe can produce 25 000 tons 
of natural uranium by 1967-68,  assuming  half of the reactors installed 
require enriched fuel from the U.S. If  the latter were financed abroad, the 
foreign exchange hill for fuel would he less than $ 600 million in the first 
ten years, and perhaps$ 125 million a year thereafter, subject to reductions 
by the sale 01· use of plutonium (worth$ 65 million a year after 1967). 
If 15  million nuclear kW is in service by 1967, the saving on the 
foreign exchange hill for imports of conventional fuels would exceed $ 2 500 
million by that date, with an annual saving of$ 850 million thereafter, 
apart from the effect of further extensions of nuclear capacity. So, after 
incurring a debit of some hundred millions of dollars in total prior to 1965, 
as the unavoidable price to make a  quick start possible, the net saving 
would rise rapidly to $ 600-700 million a  year by the time 15 million kW 
of nuclear plant is in service. 
-88-ANNEX IV 
GROWTH  OF  ELECTRICITY  SYSTEM 
IN THE EURATOM  COUNTRIES 
Development Trends and Rates of Expansion. 
1.  In the last 30 years the production of electricity has expanded at an 
annual rate of 5 to 6%; it has thus doubled over periods of 12 to 14 years. 
Trend of Electricity Production 1925-55 
German Federal Republic •••..•.•.••••...••••••• 
Belgium  ••...••••••..•••••••...•••••••....•.•• 
France •••...••••••..••••••••...•••••••..•••••• 
Italy .•••••..•••••••..•.•••••.•.••••••...••••• 
Netherlands (1935-55)  .•••.•..•...•••......••••• 
Annual rate of 
increase 
(%) 
6.1 
5.4 
5.0 
5.7 
5.6 
Increase 
in 10 years 
(%) 
80 
69 
63 
73 
72 
These rates were affected by the great depression and the war. In 
the post-war period the rates  of increase of electricity production rose, 
doubling in ten years. Until about 1965 this rate  of increase  will  still be 
maintained as the general trend, though there may be special circumstances 
in some countries which in the course even of this decade may diminish 
this rate somewhat. It is, therefore, not an easy matter to prophesy how 
the requirements for electricity will develop in the later years of the period 
we are now considering. It is, however, widely agreed that in twenty years' 
time requirements will at the least be trebled, and at most quadrupled. For 
the purpose of the present report we have adopted an estimate which, for 
the period up to 1975, represents more or less a  mean between the triple 
-89-and quadruple of the 1955 production figures,  due allowance being made 
for  special  conditions in particular countries. Thus, the average annual 
rate of increase for the period 1955 to 1965 is estimated at about 7% and 
for the period 1965 to 1975 at 5.7%. This corresponds to the development 
trends which have obtained over the last 25 to 35 years. 
Net Output of Electricity in the Six Countries (1) 
Production  Index figures  Production of 
Country  1955  Electricity (TWh) 
(TWh)  1955-65  1965-75  1955-75  1965  1975 
German Fed. Republic •  74.4  200  175  350  149  260 
Belgium •••...•••••...  10.9  160  150  250  17  26 
France •..••..••••••..  49.7  200  175  350  100  175 
Italy ...••.•...•••••..  37.8  190  175  335  72  126 
Luxembourg •..••••••.  1.1  150  150  280  2  3 
Netherlands ••....•••••  10.6  190  175  331  20  35 
Total .•••••••  184.5  195  174  339  360  625 
(1)  The following definitions and abbreviations are used: 
(a)  Generating plant =publicly-owned power stations, independent industrial 
generators, pit-head power stations and railway power plants. 
(b)  Capacity =  maximum net capacity at end of year, calculated at high-tension 
terminals. 
(c)  Electricity output =  net delivery of electricity to the grid (exclusive of own 
consumption and transformer losses). 
{d)  Utilization =  computed number of  equivalent full-load hours per annum = h' 
(e)  Load-factor  =  number of utilized hours per annum as  a  percentage of 
8,760 hours in a year. 
{f) kW  =kilowatt; MW =megawatt= 1000 kW. 
(g)  kWh =kilowatt-hours ( =  860 Kcal); 
TWh =  terrawatt-hours ( =  1000 million kWh). 
-90-Comparison with Estimates by the High Authority and O.E.E.C. 
2.  The total figures given above for the six countries agree closely with 
those given by the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community in 
the document 'General Objectives for Coal and Steel' and also in the still 
unpublished document of its Mixed Committee 'Structure and Trends of 
Development in the Electricity Industry'. However, estimates for the pro-
duction in individual countries differ much more on account of use of net 
instead of gross figures,  and assumption in this report of maximum ex-
ploitation of hydro and lignite resources. 
3.  The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation  (O.E.E.C.) 
estimates that in 10 years the output of electrical current will increase at 
an annual rate of 7%, whereas in the case of the second decade it adopts an 
optimistic estimate of a 7% rate of increase and a conservative estimate of 
a 5% rate of increase (1). These rates of growth agree with those adopted 
in the present Report. 
The Role of Pit-head Power Stations. 
4.  The General Objectives Committee has made estimates for the ex-
pansion of pit-head power stations to 1975 on the basis of expected pro-
duction of low-grade  coal  (see  Annex I, para.  7).  This  group  of power 
stations includes cooperative plants of the mining industry, which deliver 
a large part of their output into the public grid; and about one-fourth of 
the fuel they consume is saleable coal. Furthermore, a  part of low-grade 
coal output is used for purposes other than electricity production, such as 
air compression at pit-head and gas generation. The high electricity esti-
mates for these stations (given below) are based on the optimistic forecast 
of coal production, and should therefore be considered  as  a  theoretical 
maximum. 
(1)  Europe's Growing Needs of Energy, p. 34 
-91-Capaeity and Output of Pit-Head Plants 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capaciJy (eMW): 
German Fed. Republic •.•••••  2 254  4 495  7 000  10 300  13 300 
Belgium .••.•••.••••••..••••  641  1240  1300  1400  1400 
France •••.•.•••••..••••••••  1790  2 540  2 800  3 000  3 200 
Italy •..•••••.••••••••.•••••  65  70  70  70 
Nether  lands •••••••...•••••••  283  360  400  400  400 
Total ••••••••••••••  4968  8 700  11570  15 170  18 370 
Net output (TWh): 
German Fed. Republic •..••••  11.1  12.2  23.8  37.0  52.4  68.5 
Belgium ••...•••••.•.••••••.  1.8  2.0  3.7  4.0  4.4  4.4 
France •••.••••••.•••••••.••  8.9  9.3  12.9  14.6  15.1  16.1 
Italy ...••••..••••...•.•••••  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Nether  lands ••...••••.•••••••  1.4  1.4  1.8  2.0  2.0  2.0 
Total ••••••••••.•••  23.2  24.9  42.5  58.0  74.3  91.4 
Total  Fuel Consumption (Mt HCE)  ••  13.2  21.2  26.1  32.0  36.4 
Tables for the Electrical Industry of the Six Countries. 
5.  The following tables showing the capacity, electricity output and 
fuel consumption are based on data from government departments, elec-
tricity boards or other authoritative sources; where we have made our own 
estimates, no objections have been raised by the above bodies to the figures 
utilized here. 
The figures for capacity refer to the end of the year. The electricity 
output for 1955 is shown in brackets. The unbracketed figures of the output 
for 1955 and following years are adjusted to the end of the year. The data 
for the fuel consumption of thermal power stations have been taken from 
the energy balance-sheets of the countries concerned. 
-92-German Federal Republic 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW): 
Hydro-power ••..•••••••..  2 858  3 330  3 570  4 000  4 250 
Gas-fired •••••....•••••.•  412  525  620  690  800 
Brown-coal •.•...•••.•••.  3 678  5 000  7 500  9 700  12 000 
Other thermal •..•••.••...  11948  15 000  20 860  28 650  38 000 
Total ...••••••••  18 896  23 855  32 550  43 040  55 050 
Net output (TWh): 
Hydro-power ••••...•••..•  (11.8)  12.2  14  15  16  17 
Gas-fired ..••••.••......•  (  1.9)  2.0  2  2  3  4 
Brown-coal ...•••...•..••  (18.9)  19.5  30  45  58  72 
Other thermal. ••...•••.••  (41.8)  43.2  60  91  126  167 
Total •••.•..•••.  (74.4)  76.9  106  153  203  260 
Fuel consumption of  other  thermal stations 
Brown-coal  power stations 
(Mt HCE) ...............  520  10.1  15  21  26  30 
Other  thermal  power  sta-
tions (Mt HCE) ....••••  9.8  22.4  30  41  55  68 
Gm (HCE)JkWh ••••••••••  22.5  520  500  470  440  410 
Great progress has been made in the Federal Republic in  the develop-
ment  of  hydro-power  stations;  development  capacity  is  estimated  at 
5 500  eMW  of which  a  half will actually be utilized. The economic con-
ditions for the hydraulic power still utilizable are relatively less favourable 
than for the capacity utilized to date. The slightly declining expectations 
for a future increase in output are reflected in a fall in the load-factor. 
The capacity and output of brown-coal power stations are shown in 
the table at their maximum potential. The 1975 figures, moreover, should 
be regarded as representing the absolute upper limit for the exploitation 
of brown-coal  deposits.  The load-factor of brown-coal power stations is 
estimated, in accordance with their status as base-load stations, at 70%. 
-93-The capacity and output of  power stations operated on blast-furnace 
gas are estimated in the light of the expected increase in the production 
of pig iron. As  working hours in the iron and steel industry have been 
reduced, the load-factor of such plants should not rise substantially. 
The other thermal power stations are at present almost exclusively 
coal-fired.  The actual fuel consumption of the most up-to-date plants is 
nowadays about 400 gm/kWh. It is, however, hardly likely that the average 
consumption of all thermal power stations will  fall  below 400  gm/k  Wh 
within the next twenty years. 
Belgium 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW) 
Hydro-power  .•..•...••  48  72  72  72  72 
Gas-fired ••..••..•.....  200  250  270  310  350 
Other thermal  ...•.....  2 615  3 418  4 258  5 243  6 508 
Total .•.•.•...  2 863  3 740  4 600  5 625  6 930 
Net output (TWh) 
Hydro-power ..•....•..  (  0.1)  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Gas-fired .........•••••  (  1.3)  1.3  1.5  1.7  1.9  2.1 
Other thermal  .•....•.•  (  9.5)  9.8  12.4  16.1  20.0  24.7 
Total •.......•  (10.9)  11.2  14.1  18.0  22.1  27.0. 
Fuel consumption of  other thermal stations 
Mt HCE ..•...........  4.8  5.0  6.0  7.0  8.5  10.0 
Gm(HCE)fk  Wh  .••.•••.  510  510  480  460  430  410 
The forward estimate of  electricity output is based on the assumption 
of an increase in industrial output of 3.5% per annum (mean figure)  (1). 
(1)  See 'Evaluation de Ia part relative aux.  centrales electriques nucleaires dans 
les futures installations de production d'energie electrique'; Ministere des Affaires Econo-
miques, Bruxelles, 1956. 
-94-Utilization is  relatively low  at about 3 800  hours/year and in the next 
20 years it will rise by 0.5% per annum. The capacity figures take into 
account  peak requirements.  The  output  of power  stations  operated  on 
blast-furnace gas has been estimated relative to the increase in the output 
of pig iron. 
Franee 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW) 
Hydro-power ..•.•...••  7 548  9 250  13 250  18100  23 000 
Gas-fired ..••..••....•.  700  850  1 000  1 200  1400 
Other thermal  ••.....•.  6 000  9 600  13 100  19 000  25 600 
Total .•.•.....  14 248  19 700  27 350  38 300  50 000 
Net output (TWh) 
Hydro-power ..........  (25.6)  26.5  32.0  45.0  58.0  70.0 
Gas-fired ••.....•••....  (  3.6)  3.7  4.5  5.5  6.5  7.5 
Other thermal  •........  (20.5)  21.2  36.5  52.5  75.5  102.5 
Total .........  (49.7)  51.4  73.0  103.0  140.0  180.0 
Fuel consumption of  other thermal stations 
Mt  HCE ••••.•.•••••••  12.1  12.5  20  26  35  46 
Gm(HCE)fk  Wh  ••••.•..  590  550  550  500  470  450 
Only in the case of hydro-power stations has an optimistic estimate 
been assumed which reckons with the development of practically all of the 
hydraulic resources still available. France's hydro-power reserves are esti-
mated as follows: 
Economically possible production . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • • . . . .  70  TWh 
Actual production . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .  25.5  TWh 
Ratio of actually utilized to potential hydro resources • . . . . . . . • . • .  38  % 
On the assumption that the overall production of  electricity will in-
crease three and a half times from 1955 to 197 5, the· production of thermal 
-95-power stations (excluding plants operated on blast-furnace gas) will increase 
sixfold. The great majority of these power stations are at present fired on 
coal; only 7% use oil. 
Italy 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW) 
Hydro-electricity 
and geothermal  8 988  11125  13122  13 835  15 890 
Thermal .•.•....•.•••..  2118  5 600  7 000  13 000  17 300 
Total •••••..•.  11106  16 725  20 122  26 835  33190 
Net output (TWh) 
Hydro-electricity 
and geothermal  (32.6)  33.7  40  47  50  52 
Thermal ..•...•..•.••••  (  5.2)  5.4  17  27  52  78 
Total .•••••...  (37.8)  39.1  57  74  102  130 
Fuel consumption of  other thermal stations 
Mt HCE ••••..•••••..•  2.2  2.3  7  11  19  28 
Gm(HCE)jkWh  .•.•••..  430  430  410  390  370  360 
More than 80o/ 0  of the production of electricity is produced by hydro 
and geothermal power stations. As, however, most of the hydro-power that 
can be economically developed is already being utilized, the future will see 
great structural changes in the electrical industry. 
Hydro-power available for economic development  • • • • • . . • • • • • • • •  50  TWh 
Electricity produced in 1955  . • • . . . • . . . . . . • . • • • • • • • . . . . • • • • • • • •  30.80  TWh 
Ratio of utilized to available sources • • • • • • • . . . • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • •  61  % 
The hydro-power resources that can still be developed will operate 
under conditions that are becoming economically less and less favourable; 
this ·will be reflected in a tendency to build peak-load plants having lower 
annual load-factors. 
-96-The electricity output attributable to thermal power stations will 
in future rise to more than 60% of total production, and in the absence of 
additional domestic fuel supplies, almost all of this increase will probably 
be imported oil, except insofar as nuclear energy takes its place. Utilization 
of thermal power stations amounted in 1955 to about 2 500 hours/year. 
We have assumed that by 1975 it will have risen to 4 500 hours/year. 
Luxembourg 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW) 
Hydro-power ...................  1  16  22  22  22 
Gas-fired ...•.•.................  202  220  240  250  250 
Total ..................  203  236  262  272  272 
Net output (TWh) 
Hydro-power ...................  0.003  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Gas-fired ..•.....•.••••.....•.•.  1.100  1.21  1.32  1.38  1.38 
Total ................••  1.103  1.25  1.39  1.45  1.45 
Electricity is produced almost exclusively by power stations oper-
ating on blast-furnace gas from the iron and steel industry. There are further 
plans for developing the country's rather small resources in natural water 
power and longer-term plans also for a power station on the Moselle to be 
developed along with the canalization of this river. 
Netherlands 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW) 
Thermal power •••.••...  3 570  4 300  6 000  7 500  9 125 
Net output (TWh) 
Thermal power •••.••...  (10.6)  11.0  15  21  28  37 
Fuel consumption 
Mt  HCE •••••...••.••.  5.4  7  9  12  15 
Gm(HCE)fkWh  ••••••••  490  460  440  420  400 
-97-The Netherlands has  only thermal power stations,  most of therrt 
coal-fired. 
Tota1s for Six Countries 
Year  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1955  End of  year 
Net capacity (eMW) 
Hydro-power ......•...  19 443  23 793  30 036  36 029  43 234 
Gas-fired ...........•..  1 514  1 845  2130  2 450  2 800 
Brown-coal power ....•.  3 678  5 000  7 500  9 700  12 000 
Other thermal  ........•  26 251  37 918  52 800  73 393  96 533 
Total ......•.•  50 886  68 556  92 466  121572  154 567 
Net output (TWh) 
Hydro-power  ........••  (70.2)  72.6  86  107  124  139 
Blast-furnace gas ......•  (  7.9)  8.1  9  11  13  15 
Brown-coal .....•.....•  (18.9)  19.5  30  45  58  72 
Other thermal  .........  (87.6)  90.5  141  208  302  410 
Total .........  (184.6)  190.7  266  371  497  636 
Fuel Consumption of  other. thermal stations 
Mt  HCE ••.••.•..•..••  46.4  47.6  70  93  130  164 
Gm(HCE)fk  Wh  •....•.•  530  530  500  450  430  400 
-98-ANNEX V 
I 
Terms of Reference of the Committee. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL  CONFERENCE 
ON  THE 
COMMON  MARKET 
AND 
EURATOM 
Secretariat 
Brussels, November 16, 1956 
The Heads of Delegations at the Intergovernmental Conference on 
the ·common Market and Euratom, acting on instructions from their re-
spective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on November 16, 1956, adopted the 
following resolution: 
'The Ministers of Foreign Affairs hereby instruct a  Committee con-
sisting of 
Monsieur ARMAND,  Herr ETZEL and Signor GIORDANI 
working within the framework of the Brussels  Conference  presided over 
by Monsieur Spaak, to report to them in two months' time on the amount 
of nuclear energy which can he produced in the near future in the  six 
countries, and the means to be employed for this purpose. 
'Accordingly, the Committee is to consult the authorities responsible 
who  are  to  provide  all  cooperation necessary for  the fulfilment  of the 
Committee's task as regards forecasts of energy requirements and resources 
and atomic energy programmes projected in each of  the countries concerned. 
'The Committee is hereby authorized to ask the competent authori-
ties in third countries for all such information as  it may require for the 
fulfilment of its task'. 
-99-.. ') 
II 
Joint Communique by the Department of State, the Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the Euratom Committee. 
February  8,  1957 
1.  A  Committee appointed by the Governments of Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
which are negotiating at Brussels the treaty for a European atomic energy 
community (Euratom),  concluded today its  official visit in Washington. 
The  Committee,  composed  of Mr.  Louis ARMAND,  Mr.  Franz ETZEL and 
Professor Francesco GIORDANI, called on President Eisenhower,  the Secretary 
of  State, and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and held 
discussions with officials of the Department of State and the Commission. 
2.  The Committee's task is to determine the extent to which atomic 
power can meet Europe's growing energy needs. The availability and cost 
of energy has become a limiting factor on the growth of Europe's economic 
strength and welfare. The Committee's review of the needs and possibilities 
has led it to adopt as an objective the stabilization of fuel imports early 
in the 1960's. To meet this target would require that nuclear power plants 
with a  total generating capacity of 15 000 000 k W  be installed within the 
next ten years. 
3.  Examination  of  the  Committee's  program indicates  that its  ob-
jective is feasible. Under present circumstances, the availability of nuclear 
fuels is not considered to be a limiting factor. A joint group of experts to 
be designated by the Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission will 
continue to  examine  the  technical  problems  posed by the  Committee's 
objective. 
-101-
,· 4.  The Committee pointed out that the Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) which will result from the present Brussels negotiations provides 
the framework and the stimulus required to realize the Committee's ob-
jective. It would mobilize in Europe the technical and industrial resources 
required and would provide a political entity competent to afford adequate 
safeguards  and to enter into  comprehensive and practical engagements 
with the U.S. Government. 
5.  The U.S. Government welcomes the initiative taken in the Commit-
tee's proposal for  a  bold and imaginative application of nuclear energy. 
On February 22, 1956, President Eisenhower in announcing the allocation 
of 20 000 kilograms of U -235 for sale or lease outside the U.S. for peaceful 
purposes (principally power and research reactors) stated, 'significant ac-
tions are under way to create an international agency and an integrated 
community for Western Europe to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
The United States welcomes  this progress and will  cooperate with such 
agencies  when  they  come into existence.' The United States anticipates 
active association in the achievement of the Committee's objective, and 
foresees a fruitful two-way exchange of experience and technical develop-
ment, opening a new area for mutually beneficial action on both the govern-
mental and the industrial level and reinforcing solidarity within Europe 
and across the Atlantic. 
-102-m 
Joint Communique by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and 
the Euratom Committee. 
A  Committee appointed by the Governments of Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
which  are this month to  sign  a  Treaty instituting a  European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom),  today concluded its visit to the United 
Kingdom. 
The  Committee,  composed  of Monsieur  Louis  ARMAND  (France), 
Herr Franz ETZEL  (Germany), and Professor Francesco GIORDANI  (Italy), 
called  on  Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the  Council,  and Lord 
Mills, the Minister. of Power, and has held discussions with the Chairmen, 
Members and officials  of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority and of the 
Central Electricity Authority. 
The  Committee also  spent a  day at the Nudear Power Plant at 
Calder Hall and has held discussions with representatives of the industries 
concerned with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy projects. 
The Committee's iask is to determine the extent to which atomic 
power can meet Europe's growing energy needs. The availability and cost 
of energy has become a limiting factor on the growth of Europe's economic 
strength and welfare. The Committee's review of the needs and possibilities 
has led it to adopt as an objective the stabilization of coal and oil imports 
early in the 1960's. 
To meet this target would require that nuclear power plants with 
a total generating capacity of 15 million k W  be installed within the next 
ten years. 
-103-The United Kingdom's  dependence upon imported fuels  although 
relatively less great than that of the six nations has led the United Kingdom 
to develop as quickly as possible the use of atomic energy for power. 
The Chairmen and Members of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority 
have described the United Kingdom's experiences in this field, which have 
enabled the United Kingdom to embark on a  substantial programme of 
nuclear power. 
The Atomic Energy Authority and the Euratom Committee have 
held discussion concerning the contribution which the Calder Hall type of 
reactor could make to the realization of the Committee's target and the 
assistance which the United Kingdom could give to the execution of such 
a programme. A group of experts from the Committee and the U.K. Atomic 
Energy Authority will  continue to examine the technical aspects of the 
Committee's programme. 
The U.K. Atomic Energy Authority declared its readiness to facili· 
tate contacts between the United Kingdom firms  and firms  within the 
Euratom countries interested in the building of nuclear reactors. The Au· 
thority also  declared its willingness to give  such assistance as lies in its 
power towards the training of scientists and engineers.  Places could he 
provided in the Authority's Reactor School at Harwell and later on at the 
Reactor Operation School at Calder Hall. 
The Euratom Committee and the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority are 
convinced that the visit has prepared in a most useful way for cooperation 
between the U.K. Atomic  Energy Authority and the European Atomic 
Energy Community on their future power programme. 
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